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CASENOTES
PRODUCTS LIABILITY-Products Liability Applies to
the Sale of Housing and Extends to All Parties Who Are
an Integral Part of the Overall Production and Marketing
Enterprise, Including Realtors. Berman v. Watergate
West, Inc., 391 A.2d 1351 (D.C. 1978).
In recent years, the evolution and expansion of products liability law1
1. Products liability is liability imposed on a manufacturer, processor, or non-manu-
facturing seller of a defective product that causes injury to a third person. See 1 R. HURSH
& H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, § 1.1 (2d ed. 1974). The term
products liability encompasses three distinct grounds of liability: negligence, breach of war-
ranty, and strict liability in tort. Id at § 1.3. In a products liability action based on negli-
gence, a plaintiff must prove all the elements required for recovery in an ordinary negligence
action (e.g., duty, breach of duty, causation, and injury.) Id at § 1.4. In strict liability
actions, a plaintiff must establish the defective condition of the defendant's product, a causal
connection between the defective condition and the plaintiff's injury. Id at § 1.5. In actions
arising from breach of warranty, the plaintiff must establish the existence of a warranty, its
breach, and a causal connection between the breach and the injury. Id at § 1.4. See also
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §§ 96-99 (4th ed. 1971).
Historically, in actions based on implied warranties for defective products, plaintiffs have
been required to establish contractual privity with defendants. See notes 17-18 and accom-
panying text infra. Recent courts have abandoned this requirement, however, and the dif-
ferences between strict tort liability and implied warranty actions have become academic.
The two theories are functionally indistinguishable. See, e.g., Cottom v. McGuire Funeral
Serv., Inc., 262 A.2d 807 (D.C. 1970); Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. 314, 232 A.2d
897 (1967), rei'd on other grounds, 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969); Santor v. A & M
Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). See also Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1134 (1960) [hereinafter cited
as Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel]; R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, supra note 1, at § 4.2. See
generall Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 402,4 and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 22 STAN. L. REV. 713 (1970). The Restatement clarifies this area by suggesting that
the term "warranty" may be used interchangeably with "strict liability":
A number of courts, seeking a theoretical basis for the liability, have resorted to
a 'warranty,' either running with the goods sold, by analogy to covenants running
with the land, or made directly to the consumer without contract. In some in-
stances this theory has proved to be an unfortunate one. Although warranty was in
its origin a matter of tort liability, and it is generally agreed that a tort action will
still lie for its breach, it has become so identified in practice with a contract of sale
between the plaintiff and the defendant that the warranty theory has become some-
thing of an obstacle to the recognition of the strict liability where there is no such
contract. There is nothing in this Section which would prevent any court from
treating the rule stated as a matter of 'warranty' to the user or consumer. But if this
is done, it should be recognized and understood that the 'warranty' is a very differ-
ent kind of warranty from those usually found in the sale of goods, and that it is
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has been both rapid and pervasive.2 Until the last decade, however,3 this
not subject to the various contract rules which have grown up to surround such
sales.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment m (1977).
Although implied warranty and strict liability are sometimes regarded as the same legal
right and remedy, there is at least a conceptual distinction between the two. As the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals stated in Cottom v. McGuire Funeral Serv., Inc., 262 A.2d
807 (D.C. 1970):
Implied warranty recovery is based upon two factors: (a) the product or article in
question has been transferred from the manufacturer's possession while in a 'defec-
tive' state . . . and (b) as a result of being 'defective', the product causes personal
injury or property damage. On the other hand, strict liability in tort is imposed on
a manufacturer when an article he places on the market . . . proves to have a
defect that causes injury to a human being or his property.
Id at 808.
2. The origin of modem products liability law has traditionally been traced to the
landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), in
which the court dispensed with the privity of contract requirement in negligence actions in
order to allow an injured plaintiff to recover against the negligent manufacturer of an auto-
mobile. Recent case law has substantially extended products liability to encompass all par-
ticipants in the manufacturing process, regardless of negligence, under theories of implied
warranty and/or strict liability. See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256,
391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964) (products liability extends to all parties who are
integral to the overall production and manufacturing process); Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) (manufacturer of defective
power tool held strictly liable in tort to injured consumer); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instru-
ment Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963) (airplane manufacturer
held liable to passenger under implied warranty of fitness and merchantability); Randy
Knitwear Inc. v. American Cyanimid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363
(1962) (privity of contract not required to recover on express warranty of defendant manu-
facturer). See generall, text accompanying notes 17-30 infra. For a history of the rapid
development of products liability law, see Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel, supra note 1, at
1099-114; Note, The Expanding Scope of Enterprise Liability, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1084
(1969); PROSSER, supra note 1, at §§ 96 to 104.
3. To date, forty-two states and the District of Columbia have adopted the concept of
strict products liability. See, e.g., Julander v. Ford Motor Co., 488 F.2d 839 (9th Cir. 1973)
(interpreting Utah law); Clary v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P.2d 244 (Alaska
1969); O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968) (en banc); Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prod. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); Hiigel v.
General Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1975) (en banc); Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn.
290, 216 A.2d 189 (1965); Martin v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 353 A.2d 581 (Del. 1976);
Berman v. Watergate West, Inc., 391 A.2d 1351 (D.C. 1978); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Ford Motor Co. v. Lee, 137 Ga. App. 486, 224 S.E.2d 168 (1976),
mod!ftedon other grounds, 237 Ga. 554, 229 S.E.2d 379 (1976); Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-
Car Corp., 52 Hawaii 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970); Shields v. Morton Chemical Co., 95 Idaho
674, 518 P.2d 857 (1974); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965);
Ayr-Way Stores, Inc. v. Chitwood, 261 Ind. 86, 300 N.E.2d 335 (1973); Hawkeye Security
Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1970), afl'don rehearing, 199 N.W.2d 373
(Iowa 1972); Brooks v. Dietz, 218 Kan. 698, 545 P.2d 1104 (1976); Dealers Transp. Co., Inc.
v. Battery Distrib. Co., Inc., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1965); Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins.
Co. of N.Y., 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md.
337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976); Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129
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doctrine was almost exclusively limited in application to the sale of chat-
tels and remained virtually untouched in sales of real property.4 Tradi-
tionally protected by the doctrine of caveat emptor,5 builders and sellers
were able to escape liability for damage caused by defects in real property.
On the heels of several recent decisions, however, products liability has
(1965); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., Inc., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967); State
Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967);
Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969); Brandenburger v. Toyota
Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973); Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187
Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601 (1971); Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 82 Nev.
439, 420 P.2d 855 (1966); Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, Inc., 110 N.H. 36, 260 A.2d 111
(1969); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 107 A.2d 305 (1965); Stang v. Hertz
Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12
N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S. 592 (1963); Johnson v. American Motors Corp., 225
N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1975); Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., I Ohio App. 2d 374, 205 N.E.2d
92 (1965), affd, 6 Ohio App. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966); Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpa-
trick, 418 P.2d 900 (Okla. 1965); Wights v. Staff Jenings, Inc., 241 Or. 301, 405 P.2d 624
(1965); Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966); Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 109
R.I. 176, 283 A.2d 255 (1971); Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 87 S.D. 196, 205 N.W.2d 104
(1973); Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966); McKisson v. Sales
Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967); Zaleskie v. Joyce, 133 Vt. 150, 333 A.2d 110
(1975); Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969) (en banc); Dippel v.
Sciano, 37 Wis. 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967); Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co., 527 P.2d
832 (Wyo. 1974). Several states have enacted statutes endorsing strict liability. See, e.g.,
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 85.2-318.2 (1973). 14 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 221 (1973); S.C. CODE
§§ 15 to 73-10 (1976). Four states, Alabama, Massachusetts, Virginia and Wyoming have
not adopted the doctrine. See generally 1 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 4060.
4. The delayed application of products liability to the sale of realty was caused by the
courts' belief that each party has equal bargaining power in real estate transactions, thus the
purchaser could adequately protect himself through an inspection of the premises. See, e.g.,
Halliday v. Greene, 244 Cal. App. 2d 482, 53 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1966) (declining to apply strict
liability to builder because purchaser can protect himself through meaningful inspection of
the premises); Fegeas v. Sherrill, 218 Md. 472, 147 A.2d 223 (1958) (no implied warranty
against termite damage in arms-length transactions); Dennison v. Harden, 29 Wash. 2d 243,
186 P.2d 908, (1947) (no implied warranty because land has no standard quality and sale of
realty based on a variety of circumstances). See also F. WILLISTON, ON CONTRACTS § 926,
at 2602-04 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1963); Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sale of Realty--Recent As-
saults upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541 (1961). But see notes 39-42 and accompanying
text infra.
5. Caveat emptor is the ancient legal maxim that presumes a buyer is able to protect
himself in market transactions where he has an opportunity to inspect the merchandise. See
Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U.S. 108, 112 (1884). The rule developed during the
Middle Ages, before the onslaught of mass production, when a buyer and a purchaser stood
in equal bargaining positions and the buyer had a meaningful opportunity to inspect the
property for quality and defects. See generally Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat
Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931). While caveat emptor originally applied to all transfers of
property, it is no longer applicable to sales of personal property for which extensive warran-
ties are imposed by statute. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-314 (1974) (imposing implied warranty of
merchantability for sale of personal property); U.C.C. § 2-315 (1974) (imposing warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose).
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made substantial inroads into the sale of realty, particularly with respect to
the sale of newly constructed, mass-produced housing. Unable to draw
any meaningful distinction between the mass production and sale of new
homes and chattels, courts have extended products liability to encompass
the builders, developers, and sponsors of such housing.6 Recently, in
Berman v. Watergate West, Inc. ,' the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals for the first time applied products liability to the sale of housing by
holding a realtor, and possibly a cooperative association, liable to a new
home buyer. By extending products liability beyond mere developers and
builders, however, the court of appeals has substantially broadened the
scope of potential liability and in so doing has abandoned several impor-
tant policy considerations underlying products liability.
Plaintiff Edith Berman was a tenant-shareholder in Watergate West co-
operative apartments.' The apartment project was originally sponsored by
Watergate Improvements Associates which subsequently divided into two
subsidiary corporations: Watergate Construction Corporation, the builder,
and Riverview Realty Corporation, an independent sales agent.9 After the
6. See, e.g., Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970) (builder-vendor
impliedly warrants construction of home to purchaser); Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269
Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969) (builder-vendor may be held strictly liable for
defects); Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964) (builder-vendor impliedly
warrants newly constructed building); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698
(1966) (implied warranty of fitness entitles purchaser to rescission for major defects); Craw-
ley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1969) (implied warranty of workmanlike construction
in sale of new dwelling); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Ct. App. 1968) (builder
impliedly warrants that house was constructed in workmanlike manner). But see Macomber
v. Cox, 249 Or. 61, 435 P.2d 462 (1967) (strict liability held inapplicable to general contrac-
tor for subcontractor's negligent installation of fixture); Cox v. Schaffer, 223 Pa. Super. Ct.
429, 302 A.2d 456 (1973) (silo not a product within meaning of strict products liability). See
generally Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 383 (1969).
7. 391 A.2d 1351 (D.C. 1978).
8. A cooperative apartment is a multi-unit building in which each resident has an in-
terest in the entity owning the building and a proprietary lease entitling the owner to occupy
a particular apartment within the building. See 15 AM. JUR. 2d Condominums § 62 (1976).
See also Clydesdale, Inc. v. Wegener, 372 A.2d 1013 (D.C. 1977); Valois, Inc. v. Thorne, 86
A.2d 530 (D.C. 1952); 1915 16th St. Co-op. Ass'n v. Pinkett, 85 A.2d 58 (D.C. 1951). Coop-
erative associations may assume three types of legal forms: co-ownership, such as a joint
tenancy or tenancy in common, where all tenants become co-owners in fee simple; a busi-
ness trust among cooperative members to acquire and manage the property; or a corporation
that issues stock of a total par value equal to the purchase price of the property, and then
allocates the stock among the various apartments according to their estimated relative value.
The purchasers of such shares are then entitled to a proprietory lease carrying with it the
exclusive right to possession of the unit. See 2 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, COOPERATIVE
HousING LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.01(1) (1977).
9. Watergate Improvements Associates was formed in 1964 as a limited partnership.
The partnership formed two subsidiary corporations in the same year. 391 A.2d at 1352.
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building's completion and the commencement of the plaintiffs tenancy,
title passed to Watergate West, Inc., a cooperative apartment association.'
Shortly after moving in, plaintiff found several deficiencies in her apart-
ment, including a defective air conditioning unit which allegedly rendered
her apartment fifty percent uninhabitable." Subsequently, she filed suit
for damages, but only against Riverview Realty and the cooperative,
Watergate West, alleging breach of certain express and implied warranties
covering her apartment unit. I2 The trial court granted Riverview's motion
for directed verdict for two reasons: first, the evidence failed to show that
Riverview had extended any warranties to Berman; second, the evidence
demonstrated that Riverview was acting only as a selling agent for a dis-
closed principal, namely Watergate Improvements Associates. The trial
court likewise directed a verdict in favor of Watergate West, Inc., stating
10. Watergate West, Inc., formed in August of 1967, was originally incorporated and
directed by employees of either Riverview Realty or Watergate Improvements Associates.
Brief for Appellee at 3, Berman v. Watergate West, Inc., 391 A.2d 1351 (D.C. 1978). The
cooperative did not actually acquire title to the building until May 1, 1969, several months
after plaintiff took possession of her apartment. 391 A.2d at 1353.
11. At trial, plaintiff claimed the defective air conditioning system had caused substan-
tial damage to the apartment's parquet floors, the wall, and a wool rug and pad in her
bedroom. fd As a remedy, plaintiff requested a "rent refund" of one half the amount she
paid during her two and one-half year tenancy. See Record at 68, 391 A.2d at 1351.
12. Plaintiff alleged both defendants expressly and impliedly warranted the premises to
be in a good state of repair and that a high standard of management would be provided.
Plaintiff's Complaint for Damages at 1.
Interestingly, the plaintiff's "Subscription and Deposit Agreement" expressly provided a
means to settle disputes as to the condition of the apartment between the tenant and the
project's sponsor. Paragraph 6 of the agreement stated:
(b) If, at the time of final inspection, it is agreed by the Member and the Sponsor
that certain items have not been so completed, and the Member wishes to make
immediate settlement, such items shall be listed on the final inspection form, and
the Sponsor shall promptly complete such items. If the Member wishes to defer
settlement until all such items are so completed, the Member shall immediately
accept the apartment or unit subject to the items so listed, and shall, upon comple-
tion thereof, make full settlement hereunder. (c) In the event of a dispute between
the Member and the Sponsor as to whether any item has been completed in a good
workmanlike manner, the decision of the Architect referred to in the Plan of Coop-
erative Organization, or his designated representative, shall be final and binding
upon both the Member and Sponsor.
It was stipulated at the trial that the cooperative was Watergate West, Inc., the sales and
managing agent was Riverview Realty Corporation, and the sponsor was Watergate Im-
provements Associates. See Supp. Record at 88-89, Berman v. Watergate West, Inc., 391
A.2d 1351 (D.C. 1978).
Although the construction company was dissolved upon completion of the building, the
sponsor, Watergate Improvements Associates, still existed at the time of the suit. Neverthe-
less, the plaintiff sought only to bring the two defendants into the action. Interview with
Robert J. Wieferich, Attorney for Plaintiff (March 24, 1979).
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that even assuming plaintiff could show defendants had breached certain
warranties, she still had not proven any damages.
Berman subsequently appealedpro se to the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals, retaining the breach of warranty theory as her sole cause of
action. In her appellate brief, however, Berman went outside the trial rec-
ord to argue that the court erred in granting the directed verdict for lack of
contractual privity, because factually Riverview was coextensive with the
building's sponsor and builder."3 Without addressing the issue of contrac-
tual privity, the court of appeals reversed, finding the action was covered
by the law of products liability. Moreover, the court held that Riverview,
as an integral part of the overall enterprise which placed the apartment on
the market, could be held liable to the extent the apartment proved defec-
tive. 4 Judge Mack, writing for the majority,' 5 left open the question of
whether the subsequently formed cooperative could also be held liable.
Instead, she remanded the case to determine whether any obstacles existed
which might preclude plaintiff from recovering from those parties "prima-
rily responsible" for the defects. In a brief dissenting opinion, Judge Ne-
beker argued that the law of products liability was wholly inapplicable to
the action. 6 Noting that the record merely named Riverview as a real
estate agent for the building's sponsor, he concluded Riverview could not
be held liable under any theory.
By extending products liability to the sale of housing, Berman has
brought District of Columbia law in line with the clear trend of modern
decisions. By expanding the scope of this liability to include realtors, how-
ever, the court of appeals has taken a quantum leap beyond any legal pre-
cedent, and in so doing has abandoned several important policy
considerations underlying the doctrine of products liability.
13. In her self-written appeals brief, Berman stated "[flactually all three of the compa-
nies are divisions or subsidiaries of Riverview Realty Corp.; with the same offices and per-
sonnel; same address and phone number." See Brief for Appellant, supra note 10, at 3. In
fact, Riverview Realty and Watergate West, Inc. are subsidiaries of Watergate Improve-
ments Associates. See notes 9 & 10 and accompanying text supra.
14. 391 A.2d at 1359. The court did not specify whether its products liability holding
was based on the theory of strict liability or implied warranty of fitness and merchantability.
Rather, after discussing the almost identical governing principles and practical results of the
two theories, the court stated "[w]hether contract or tort, there is a liability imposed for
injury caused by placing a defective product into the stream of commerce in the District of
Columbia." Id at 1357 (citing Cottom v. McGuire Funeral Serv., Inc., 262 A.2d 807, 808-09
(D.C. 1970)). See note I and accompanying text supra.
15. Judge Kelley joined Judge Mack in the majority opinion.
16. 391 A.2d at 1360 (Nebeker, J. dissenting).
[Vol. 28:887
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I. TOWARDS PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN THE SALE OF HOUSING
Traditionally, recovery in a products liability action was based upon a
showing of negligence or breach of warranty on the part of the manufac-
turer. These theories often proved insufficient to the ultimate consumer,
however, since plaintiffs were faced with the difficult task of establishing
contractual privity or proving a specific negligent act by the manufacturer
as the cause of the injury. 7 Due to these limitations on recovery, courts
were often forced to struggle through various legal fictions to allow injured
plaintiffs to prevail.18 Justice Traynor in a landmark decision in Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. ,"9 alleviated these problems by providing a
third avenue of recovery-the doctrine of strict liability in tort.2" Uphold-
17. Failure to establish these elements often barred plaintiffs' recovery in products lia-
bility actions. See, e.g., Borucki v. Mackenzie Bros. Co., Inc., 125 Conn. 92, 3 A.2d 224
(1938) (warranty recovery unavailable to other members of buyer's family); Miami Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Reisinger, 68 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1953) (lapse of time and extent of use
between sale and injury from exploding bottle prevented inference of defendant's negli-
gence); Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E.2d 576 (1923) (buyer's employee
may not invoke warranty); Tavani v. Swift & Co., 262 Pa. 184, 105 A.2d 55 (1918) (presence
of trichinae in pork does not necessitate inference of packer's negligence). See also 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 28.12 to 28.17 (1956); Jones, Proof of the Breach
in Negligence Cases (Including Res Ipsa Loquitur), 37 VA. L. REV. 179 (1951).
18. For examples of devices courts have used to allow recoveries absent a showing of
negligence or contractual privity, see Le Blanc v. La. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Ltd., 221 La.
919, 60 So. 2d 873 (1952) (warranty of wholesomeness implied between manufacturer and
consumer); Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942)
(warranty "runs with the chattel" to protect all parties injured by a defective commodity);
Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932) (manufacturer's advertising is
express warranty to the consumer); Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., I Q.B. 256 (1893)
(manufacturer makes a continuing unilateral offer to the consumer). See also Prosser, As-
sault Upon the Citadel, supra note 1, at 1124-25; 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 17, at §
28.16; B. HURSH & H. BAILEY, supra note 1, at §§ 4.2 to 4.4.
19. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
20. Although Greenman was the first case to apply strict tort liability to actions for
ordinary defective products, the theory previously had been espoused by Justice Traynor in
a concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436
(1944) where he stated:
Even if there is not negligence, however, public policy demands that responsibility
be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health in-
herent in defective products that reach the market. . . . If such products. . . find
their way into the market it is to the public interest to place the responsibility for
whatever injury they may cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not
negligent in the manufacture of the product, is responsible for its reaching the mar-
ket.
24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 440-41. Strict liability has also been applied in other contexts.
See, e.g., Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948) (strict liability for ul-
trahazardous activity); Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939);
Blarjeske v. Thompson's Restaurant Co., 325 Ill. App. 189, 59 N.E.2d 320 (1945) (applying
strict liability to the sale of food); Graham v. Bottenfield's Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413
1979]
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ing a judgment for an injured consumer against a defendant tool manufac-
turer without a finding of contractual privity, the court stated: "a
manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the mar-
ket, knowing it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have
a defect that causes injury to a human being.",2' Underlying its ruling was
the court's desire to place the costs of injuries caused by defective products
upon the manufacturers who distribute such products, rather than upon
the injured persons who are typically powerless to protect themselves.22
The following year, in Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,23 the California
Supreme Court extended its holding in Greenman to retailers, distributors,
and all parties qualifying as "an integral part of the overall producing and
marketing enterprise."24 The plaintiff in Vandermark was injured when
the allegedly defective braking system in his automobile caused him to lose
control and careen into a street lamp. The trial court, acting only months
before Greenman was handed down, granted a nonsuit in plaintiffs action
against both the manufacturer and the retailer because of their contractual
disclaimers of liability. 25 On appeal, the California Supreme Court, in an-
other opinion authored by Justice Traynor, reversed, holding that regard-
less of contractual disclaimers of liability, strict products liability should be
imposed upon all parties in the "chain of distribution" who place a defec-
(1954); Loe v. Lenhardt, 227 Or. 242, 362 P.2d 312 (1961) (strict liability applied to abnor-
mally dangerous activities). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at §§ 75-81.
21. 59 Cal. 2d at 60, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700. The trial court granted
judgment against the manufacturer on both negligence and breach of warranty grounds.
22. 59 Cal. 2d at 61, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. In the same year, the New
York Court of Appeals reached a similar result in Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,
12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963). The court held the manufacturer of
a faulty airplane liable under an implied warranty, despite the lack of contractual privity,
stating:
[W]here an article is of such a character that when used for the purpose for which it
is made it is likely to be a source of danger to several or many people if not prop-
erly designed and fashioned, the manufacturer as well as the vendor is liable, for
breach of law-implied warranties, to the persons whose use is contemplated.
12 N.Y.2d at 436-37, 191 N.E.2d at 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 594-95 (emphasis added).
23. 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
24. 61 Cal. 2d at 262, 391 P.2d at 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899. The language in Vander-
mark concerning retailer liability formed the cornerstone of the opinion in Berman. See
note 9 supra. See also note 64 and accompanying text infra.
25. In Vandermark, the automobile dealer's express disclaimer of all warranty liability
for personal injury prompted the trial court to grant a directed verdict in favor of the retailer
on the warranty cause of action. 61 Cal. 2d at 261, 391 P.2d at 169-70, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
See generally Lasher, Strict Liability in Tortfor Defective Products.- the Road to and past
Vandermark, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 30 (1965).
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tive product on the market.26 The court reasoned that by engaging in the
business of distributing goods to the public, retailers are an essential com-
ponent of this chain and should share with manufacturers the cost of inju-
ries resulting from that defective product.
2 7
Several policy considerations justified the court's decision to extend
strict liability to retailers. First, increasing the number of potential defend-
ants in products liability actions provided an added incentive for all par-
ties in the chain of distribution to take extra precautions in handling and
inspecting goods for defects before they reach the consumer.28 Second,
since the defendants could adjust the costs of such protection among them-
selves in the course of their continued business relationship, extending
strict liability to both the manufacturer and the retailer would afford maxi-
mum protection to the injured plaintiff, yet work no injustice upon the
defendants.29 Lastly, the retailer may be the only member of the enter-
prise reasonably available to reimburse the injured plaintiff.3 °
26. The chain of distribution theory espoused in Vandermark has been widely accepted
by the courts. See generally text accompanying note 30-36 infra.
27. 61 Cal. 2d at 261, 391 P.2d at 171-72, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900. While Pandermark
was the first decision to hold a retailer of a common product strictly liable, strict liability had
been extended previously to retailers of contaminated fool. See, e.g., Sencer v. Carl's Mar-
kets, Inc., 45 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1950); Swengel v. F & E Wholesale Grocery Co., 147 Kan. 555,
77 P.2d 930 (1938); Griggs Canning Co. v. Josy, 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1948). See
also Waite, Retail Responsibility & Judicial Law Making, 34 MIcH. L. REV. 494 (1936).
28. The object of quality control in a manufacturing concern is not to optimize quality
and safety, but rather to maximize profits. The extent of quality control in production ulti-
mately rests at a level where producers feel the risk of liability resulting from defective
products is balanced by the revenue saved in not pursuing more stringent production control
standards. Thus, as the risk of liability under strict liability increases, producers will pre-
sumably be enticed to enact more stringent quality control measures. See Cowan, Some
Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077, 1087-92 (1958); Noel, Manufactur-
ers of Products-The Drft Towards Strict Liability, 24 TENN. L. REV. 963, 1010-12 (1957).
This view hag been criticized by some commentators, however, as having only a minimal
impact in forcing manufacturers to adopt stricter quality control. See Plant, Strict Liability
of Manufacturers/or Injuries Caused by Defects in Products-an Opposing View, 24 TENN. L.
REV. 938, 945 (1957); Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel, supra note 1, at 1117.
29. 61 Cal. 2d at 261, 391 P.2d at 172, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899. This rationale, often re-
ferred to as "risk spreading," is based on the premise that manufacturers and retailers are in
a better position to absorb losses from defective products by passing on the cost to consum-
ers in the form of higher prices. See Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel, supra note 1, at 1119;
Noel, supra note 28, at 1010-17.
30. 61 Cal. 2d at 261, 391 P.2d at 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899. Shortly after the Greenman
and andermark decisions, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS expressly endorsed the
theory of strict products liability. Section 402A of the RESTATEMENT, now accepted in many
jurisdictions, provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
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Spurred by the Greenman and Vandermark decisions, the District of Co-
lumbia has kept in stride with these rapid developments in products liabil-
ity. In the early case of Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp. ,3 the
Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the
purchaser of a defective new automobile could sue the manufacturer for
breach of implied warranty of fitness despite lack of contractual privity. 32
After analyzing the policy considerations underlying the concept of war-
ranty, the court concluded:
Regardless of the lack of contractual privity, the implied war-
ranty of fitness and merchantability runs to the ultimate con-
sumer for whose use the article or personal property had been
purchased. The policy of protecting the public from injury, phys-
ical or pecuniary, resulting from misrepresentation, outweighs al-
legiance to a rule of law which, if observed, might produce great
injustice.33
Several years later in Cottom v. McGuire Funeral Service, Inc.,3 4 the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals extended products liability to both
manufacturers and intermediate sellers who place defective products on
the market. While serving as a pallbearer, the plaintiff in Cottom was seri-
ously injured when the handle on the casket broke. In an action against
the funeral service company which sold the casket to the family and the
wholesaler from whom the funeral service company had purchased the
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977). Comment f to section 402A of the RE-
STATEMENT states that the rule is intended to apply to any manufacturer, wholesaler, retail
dealer, or distributor.
31. 185 A.2d 919 (D.C. 1962).
32. In Picker X-Ray, the plaintiff purchased a new General Motors car from a retail
dealer. Three months later, plaintiff was seriously injured when his car veered off the road
due to an alleged steering defect. The trial court granted a motion to dismiss in favor of the
defendant car manufacturer on the ground there was no privity between it and the pur-
chaser. Id at 920.
33. Id at 923. Elaborating on its definition of implied warranty, the court stated, "war-
ranty is a duty imposed by law for protection of the buying public, regardless of the consent
of the parties." Id at 921. The court stated further that "since the warranty is implied,
either in fact or in law, no express representations or agreements by the manufacturer are
needed." Id at 922 (emphasis added).
34. 262 A.2d 807 (D.C. 1970).
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casket, the court of appeals refused to insulate the wholesaler from liability
because of his lack of contractual privity with the injured party and found
the wholesaler liable for bringing the product into the District.35 Decisions
subsequent to Collom have reaffirmed the view that products liability in
the District of Columbia extends to all parties participating in the chain of
distribution for defective products. 6
Until recently, the doctrine of products liability which was widely ac-
cepted in the sale of chattels was virtually nonexistent in the sale of realty
because of strict judicial adherence to the common law maxim of caveat
emptor.37 With the dramatic increase in new home construction in recent
years, however, the underlying rationale of caveat emptor-that sellers
and purchasers of real property are deemed equal in bargaining positions
and thus capable of protecting themselves from defective construction-
has steadily eroded.38 Courts have found caveat emptor particularly inap-
35. Id at 810. At trial, plaintiff relied on three different theories: negligence, res ipsa
loquitur, and breach of implied warranty. The trial court directed a verdict for both defend-
ants, ruling that although there was a latent defect in the casket, plaintiff was not a "user" of
the casket and thus there was no relationship between him and the defendants. Id at 808.
The D.C. Court of Appeals ruled that plaintiff as a pallbearer was an intended user of the
casket and that an intended user is entitled to as much protection as a purchaser. Id at 809-
10. Although the court relied on Greenman and the Restatement's adoption of strict liabil-
ity, it declined to expressly adopt the doctrine and limited its holding to implied warranty.
Id at 808-09.
36. See Stewart v. Ford Motor Co., 553 F.2d 130, 137 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("it is undis-
puted. . . that the District of Columbia does recognize strict liability for manufacturers and
intermediate sellers who place on the market defective merchandise which later injures a
consumer"); McCrossin v. Hicks Chevrolet, Inc., 248 A.2d 917 (D.C. 1969) (retailer and
manufacturer of defective automobile liable on implied warranty theory); Simpson v. Logan
Motor Co., 192 A.2d 122 (D.C. 1963) (case remanded to determine whether plaintiff had
possible action in implied warranty in light of Picker X-Ray).
37. See, e.g., Druid Homes, Inc. v. Cooper, 272 Ala. 415, 131 So. 2d 884 (1961) (adher-
ence to caveat emptor makes for certainty in real estate law). See generaly Comment, The
Expanding Scope of Liability in the Home Construction Enterprise, 5 LAND AND WATER L.
REV. 637, 645-49 (1970) (caveat emptor in realty sales is justified due to the clear standard of
quality against which deviations from a norm can be measured); F. WILLISTON, ON CON-
TRACTS § 926 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1963). See also notes 4 & 5 and accompanying text supra.
Along with caveat emptor, the doctrine of merger remains in full force in realty sales.
Under this doctrine, one who contracts to buy real estate generally must specify in the deed
through an express warranty all conditions on which the transfer is premised or forego any
action against the vendor for breach of contract or warranty. Id.
38. The courts have noted several objections to the application of caveat emptor to the
sale of homes. First, because the average homebuyer lacks the necessary knowledge and
skills to adequately inspect a home, the buyer and seller no longer stand in equal bargaining
positions. See, e.g., Weeks v. Slavick Builders, Inc., 24 Mich. App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503,
(1970); Tavares v. Horstman 542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975). Second, caveat emptor often leads
to harsh results when the unwary homebuyer invests the greater part of his savings in a
defective home. See, e.g., Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698, (1966); Humber
v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex Ct. App. 1968). Additionally, the builder-vendor is usually
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propriate in the sale of mass-produced and prefabricated homes39 because
the production of such homes has become increasingly similar to the pro-
duction of chattels.4" One of the first decisions to abandon caveat emptor
in the sale of real property was Carpenter v. Donohoe,4 in which the Colo-
rado Supreme Court held a builder-vendor liable to the initial purchaser
of a completed new home under the theory of implied warranty. The
plaintiff in Carpenter, discovering severe defects in the home's construction
that rendered it hazardous to the plaintiff and his family, brought suit al-
leging fraud and breach of warranty. The trial court dismissed the breach
of warranty allegation, but allowed recovery for fraud.42 Reversing the
trial court, Justice Frantz held that in agreements between builder-vendors
and purchasers of new homes, there is an implied warranty that the builder
has complied with the building code, that the home is constructed in a
workmanlike manner, and that it is suitable for habitation.43 Since the
better equipped to prevent the occurrence of defects. See, e.g., McDonald v. Mianecki, 79
N.J. 175, 398 A.2d 1283 (1979); Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 288, 218 A.2d 771 (1972). Lastly,
the buyer of a new home clearly relies on the builder-vendor's implied representation that
the home was constructed in a reasonable and workmanlike manner. See, e.g., Pollard v.
Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974); McDonald v.
Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 398 A.2d 1283 (1979). See generally Bearman, supra note 4, at 543-
47; Hyatt & Rhoads, Concepts of Liability in the Development and Administration of Condo-
miniums and Home Owners Associations, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915, 951-76 (1976); Mal-
donado, Builder Beware: Strict Tort Liabili or Mass Produced Housing, 7 REAL ESTATE
L.J. 283, 285-88 (1979).
39. The onslaught of pre-fabricated and mass-produced housing is a relatively recent
phenomenon beginning in the wake of World War II when the demand for new housing
increased dramatically. To fulfill this new demand, homes have been constructed in a man-
ner increasingly resembling the mass-production of chattels. See Bearman, supra note 4, at
542: Maldonado, supra note 38, at 286-87; Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Homebuyer." The
Housing Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835, 837 (1967).
40. See, e.g., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 90, 207 A.2d 314, 325 (1965)
("no meaningful distinctions between . . . mass production and sale of homes and mass
production and sale of automobiles and . . . the pertinent overriding policy considerations
are the same"). Accord, Kriegler v. Eichler Homes Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr.
749 (1969); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966). See also Maldonado,
supra note 38, at 298-300.
41. 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964). Prior to Carpenter, several jurisdictions extended
an implied warranty of habitability to homes purchased while under construction. See, e.g.,
Glisan v. Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963); Weck v. A & M Sunrise Constr.
Co., 36 Ill. App. 2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 728 (1962); Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340,
140 N.E.2d 819 (1957); Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474
(1958). In so doing, courts have assumed that a purchaser of a completed home can always
inspect it for defects in its final form, while the purchaser of a home under construction has
no such opportunity. See Bearman, supra note 4, at 544.
42. 154 Colo. at 79, 388 P.2d at 400.
43. 154 Colo. at 83-84, 388 P.2d at 402. The court rejected the notion that a different
rule should apply to the sale of a home under construction than to a completed home stating
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Carpenter decision, the trend in most jurisdictions has been to extend an
implied warranty of habitability to initial purchasers of mass-produced
housing."
The following year, in Schiper v. Levitt & Sons Inc. ,45 the New Jersey
Supreme Court extended the liability of builder-vendors of defective mass-
produced housing beyond those parties in contractual privity by adopting
the doctrine of strict tort liability.46 In Schipper, the plaintiff, a tenant of
the original purchaser, sued the builder-vendor for injuries suffered by his
child due to a defective hot water system. Declaring that it could find "no
meaningful distinctions between the mass production and sale of homes
and the mass production and sale of automobiles," the court reversed the
trial court's judgment of nonsuit and found the developer could be held
liable under the principles of "warranty or strict liability. 47 In dismissing
as unimportant the plaintiff's lack of privity, the court stated:
[I]t seems hardly conceivable that a court recognizing the modern
need for a vendee occupant's right to recover on principles of
implied warranty or strict liability would revivify the require-
ment of privity, which is fast disappearing in the comparable
products liability field, to preclude a similar right in other occu-
pants likely to be injured by the builder vendor's default.48
The court noted several policy justifications for an extension of strict
liability to the realty field. First, the average purchaser of a mass-pro-
duced, prefabricated home is typically unable to adequately inspect the
home,49 and thus relies on the developer's skill and implied representation
that the home will be constructed in a workmanlike manner. Second, the
home buyer does not stand on equal footing with the builder-vendor of a
"[t]o say that the former may rely on an implied warranty and the latter cannot is recogniz-
ing a distinction without a reasonable basis for it." Id
44. See cases cited in note 6 supra.
45. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
46. The only court to apply strict liability to the sale of housing before Schipper was the
Supreme Court of Mississippi in State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss.
1966). Relying on section 402A of the RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, the court found a build-
ing contractor strictly liable for installing a defective stove in plaintiff's home. Although
applying policy considerations similar to Schipper, the court did not discuss its holding in
relation to the common law restriction on application of strict liability to the sale of realty.
47. 44 N.J. at 96, 207 A.2d at 329. The court's either/or language indicated that it was
treating the implied warranty concept and strict tort liability as synonymous. This is consis-
tent with the current approach, which treats the two theories as functionally indistinguish-
able. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 1. See also Maldonado, supra
note 38, at 296-97.
48. 44 N.J. at 95, 207 A.2d at 328.
49. Id at 91, 207 A.2d at 325.
1979]
Catholic University Law Review
mass-produced home.5° Moreover, public interest dictates that "if such
injury results from defective construction, its cost should be borne by the
responsible developer who created the danger and who is in a better eco-
nomic position to bear the loss, rather than by the injured party who justi-
fiably relied on the developer's skill and implied representation."5 1
Since Carpenter and Schipper, the doctrine of products liability has been
increasingly applied to the sale of real estate, whether under the rubric of
strict liability or under a theory of implied warranty of habitability.52
Moreover, although Carpenter and Schifper involved only the builder-
vendors of prefabricated housing, other jurisdictions have extended prod-
ucts liability to include landlords5" and builder-developers of condomin-
ium units.54  For example, in Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,55 the
50. See generally Bearman, supra note 4, at 545-48; Comment, Implied Warranties in the
Sale of New Homes, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 626 (1971).
51. 44 N.J. at 91, 207 A.2d at 326.
52. Since the Schipper decision, several other courts have expressly applied the strict
tort liability theory to the sale of real property. See, e.g., Stuart v. Crestview Mutual Water
Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 802, 110 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1973) (residential developer strictly liable to
purchaser for installation of defective water system); Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal.
App. 2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969) (manufacturer of a lot strictly liable for defective
subsurface conditions resulting from improper filling and grading); Kriegler v. Eichler
Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969) (builder-vendor strictly liable to
home's second owner for damage caused by defective heating system); Smith v. Old Warson
Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972) (recovery allowed for faulty concrete foundation in
new home under § 402A). For a list of cases applying products liability to housing under an
implied warranty theory, see note 6 supra.
53. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970) (implied warranty of habitability included in residential leases); Golden
v. Conway, 55 Cal. App. 3d 948, 128 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976) (suggesting landlord may be held
strictly liable in tort for injury to persons or property when defective appliance used in
normal manner); Lemke v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969) (implied warranty
of habitability in residential lease based on products liability precedents). But see Dwyer v.
Skyline Apartments, Inc., 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973) (implied warranty of habitability
does not give rise to strict tort liability for tenant's personal injury).
54. See, e.g., Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11, aj'dper curiam, 264 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1972).
See notes 57-62 and accompanying text infra. In perhaps the furthest extension of products
liability in the sale of housing to date, the Supreme Court of California in Connor v. Great
Western Savings & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968), held a
lending institution liable on negligence grounds for financing an undercapitalized and inex-
perienced real estate developer. The extension of products liability to lenders is still a mi-
nority position, however, and the Connor decision has been narrowly interpreted. See, e.g.,
Kinner v. World Savings & Loan Ass'n, 57 Cal. App. 3d 724, 129 Cal. Rptr. 400 (1976)
(distinguishing Connor due to less integral role of lender); Skerlec v. Wells Fargo Bank Nat'l
Ass'n, 18 Cal. App. 3d 1003, 96 Cal. Rptr. 434 (1971) (lender insulated from liability for
acting merely in a lending role). See also Gutierrez, Liability of a Construction Lender under
Civil Code Section 3434: An Amorphous Epitaph to Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan
Association, 8 PAC. L.J. 1 (1977).
55. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
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United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that a
warranty of habitability, as measured by the standards set out in the hous-
ing regulations, is implied by law in all leases, and that breach of this war-
ranty gives rise to the usual remedies for breach of contract.56 Implied
warranty also provided the basis for recovery in Gable v. Silver.5 7 In Ga-
ble, a group of condominium apartment owners sued the project's builder-
developers for damage caused by a defective air-conditioning unit. The
Florida Court of Appeals upheld the judgment for the plaintiffs by declar-
ing that in keeping with "present day trends, logic and practical justice in
realty dealings," an implied warranty of fitness and merchantability from
the builder should extend to the purchaser of new condominiums. 8 This
recognition of implied warranties in condominium sales has been codified
in several jurisdictions.59 In keeping with this trend, the District of Co-
lumbia City Council recently passed the Condominium Act of 1976,60 re-
quiring all builders and developers of condominiums to warrant each unit
against structural defects for one year from the date each unit is con-
veyed.61 Moreover, similar legislation with respect to cooperatives has
56. 428 F.2d at 1082. The court relied on the same reasons for imposing liability under
an implied warranty of habitability in residential leases as it did in the sale of housing: the
inequality of bargaining power between the landlord and tenant; the lack of tenant leverage
in enforcing demands for better housing; the severe shortage of housing that increases the
landlord's bargaining power and escalates the need for maintaining and improving apart-
ments; and the indignity of slum living and its detrimental effect on the whole society. Id at
1079-80. Cf. Brown v. Southhall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. 1968) (any lease of prem-
ises containing housing violations existing at the beginning of the tenancy known to the
landlord is illegal and void).
57. 258 So. 2d 11, afd per curiam, 264 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1972).
58. 258 So. 2d at 18. Notably, the court limited application of this warranty to builders.
Id
59. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 718.203 to 719.203 (West Supp. 1978) (extending
three-year warranty of fitness and merchantability to both condominiums and cooperatives);
MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 10-203, 10-204 (1976) (extending one year warranty of
habitability and workmanlike construction to sales of all property including condominiums);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3B-3 (authorizing N.J. Department of Community Affairs to promul-
gate warranties in new homes).
60. D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-1201 (Supp. V 1978). Section 5-1247(b) provides in pertinent
part:
(b) [t]he declarant shall warrant against structural defects [in] each of the units for
one year from the date each is conveyed and all of the common elements for two
years. . . . [Flor the purposes of this subsection, structural defects shall be those
defects in components constituting any unit or common elements which reduce the
stability or safety of the structure below accepted standards or restrict the normal
intended use of all or part of the structure and which require repair, renovation,
restoration, or replacement. Nothing in the subsection shall be construed to make
the declarant responsible for any items of maintenance relating to the units or com-
mon elements. . ..
61. Notably, the statutory guarantee only applies to persons who execute the condomin-
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been proposed before the Council.62
Despite this rapid development and acceptance of products liability in
the sale of realty, a notable distinction exists between the scope of liability
in sales of realty and in sales of chattels. Unlike chattels, in which liability
extends to all parties in the chain of production and distribution, products
liability (either under implied warranty or strict liability) in the sale of
realty has never been imposed on a party other than a builder or developer
of a particular project.63 In Berman v. Watergate West, Inc., the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals tried to close this gap by applying the "chain
of distribution" theory espoused in Vandermark to the sale of mass-pro-
duced housing.
II. BERMAN V WATERGATE WEST, INC.: AN OVEREXTENSION OF
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
This recent trend abandoning caveat emptor and traditional remedies
for the sale of defective housing provided the foundation for the decision
in Berman v. Watergate West, Inc. After a lengthy discussion of the devel-
opment of products liability in the housing market, the majority sought to
bring itself in line with recent decisions by holding the defendants account-
able regardless of contractual privity. Relying on the strict liability theory
espoused in Vandermark, the court held that all parties playing an integral
part in placing the defective apartment on the market could be held liable
to the ultimate consumer.64 By extending products liability beyond the
builder and sponsor of a cooperative apartment to encompass the realty
company and possibly even a cooperative association, however, the court
of appeals has significantly surpassed the scope of previous decisions.
ium's original declaration or on whose behalf the declaration is executed, namely a condo-
minium sponsor. Id at § 5-1202(k). Thus, there is no statutory authority for holding a
realtor or cooperative association liable under an implied warranty.
62. See the proposed amendment in the nature of a substitute to Bill 2-248, D.C. Coun-
cil § 212 (1978) (calling for a three year warranty against material defects in the sale of
newly constructed cooperative apartments). The proposed amendment was dropped from
active consideration by the Committee on Housing and Urban Development, however, in
the wake of strong opposition at a July 14, 1978 public hearing. Interview with Pierre J.
Wessel, Attorney for the Committee on Housing and Urban Development (May 22, 1979).
63. See, e.g., Cottom v. McGuire Funeral Serv., Inc., 262 A.2d 807 (D.C. 1970) (whole-
saler of defective chattel held liable in breach of implied warranty action); McCrossin v.
Hicks Chevrolet, Inc., 248 A.2d 917 (D.C. 1969) (retailer of defective automobile held liable
under breach of implied warranty theory). Compare Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415
P.2d 698 (1966) (builder-developer liable under implied warranty theory, but realtor not
liable absent showing of actionable fraud) with Crawley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky.
1969) (builder-seller liable for breach of implied warranty, but realtor not liable absent
showing he knew or should have known of defective condition).
64. 391 A.2d at 1359.
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To the extent that Berman extends liability to builders and vendors only,
the decision is a well reasoned approach, destined to bring District of Co-
lumbia law much closer to the realities of the modern housing market. The
following factors illustrate the logic of this approach. First, in an era when
prefabricated homes are increasingly being built in response to severe
housing shortages, the buyer and seller no longer stand in equal bargain-
ing positions in negotiating the sale of a home. Essentially, the ordinary
purchaser is often limited to mass-produced housing in which he has
neither the competency nor the money to adequately inspect a home for
hidden defects, and thus he is forced to rely on the skill of the developer
and implied representations that the home is reasonably fit for habita-
tion.65 Second, the risk of products liability for mass-produced housing
may arguably reduce the consumer's risk by promoting stricter quality
control in the construction and inspection of new homes.66 Lastly, while
the added costs of products liability may prove only incidental to the con-
scientious, quality minded builder, the costs of litigating complaints and
repairing defects may effectively weed out builders and developers who
consistently market defective housing.67 Consequently, the Berman deci-
sion will allow the homebuyer greater protection against latent defects
while distributing the losses among those better able to afford them.68
Although the adoption of products liability for builders and vendors
may be well reasoned and long overdue, the extension of such liability to
real estate agents and possibly to the subsequently formed cooperative as-
sociations does not merit the same regard. The Berman court held River-
view Realty accountable to the plaintiff because it had occupied an
integral role in the overall production and marketing enterprise by placing
the defective apartment into the stream of commerce.6 9 After noting that
65. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 91, 207 A.2d 214, 325 (1965). See notes
44-51 and accompanying text supra.
66. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
67. One of the first advocates of this view was Lord Williston, who, in speaking of
implied warranties in real estate, stated, "[ilt would be much better if this enlightened ap-
proach were generally adopted with respect to the sale of new homes for it would tend to
discourage much of the sloppy work of jerry-building that has become perceptible over the
years." F. WILLISTON, ON CONTRACTS § 926A (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1963). Accord, Humber v.
Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 562 (Tex. 1968) (caveat emptor would lend "encouragement to the
unscrupulous, fly-by-night operator and purveyor of shoddy work"). See also Maldonado,
supra note 38, at 300.
68. This risk spreading policy was initially recognized with respect to chattels. See note
29 supra. This rationale has since been recognized by commentators as applicable to the
sale of housing. See, e.g., Maldonado, supra note 38, at 300.
69. 391 A.2d at 1359. Although Vandermark was decided solely on grounds of strict
liability, it is unclear whether Berman was decided exclusively on grounds of strict liability
or implied warranty of habitability. Rather, the court stated "[w]hether contract or tort,
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the realty company was formed as a subsidiary of the project's sponsor, the
majority justified its extension of liability to Riverview by holding that a
sponsor's division into subsidiaries should not insulate it from liability.
Notably, however, the court did not hold Riverview liable because it might
have acted as the alter ego of the project's sponsor.7" As Judge Nebeker's
dissenting opinion points out, there is absolutely no evidence in the record
that Riverview was "one and the same" with the builder or sponsor, nor
was there any suggestion of fraud or deceit regarding the company's incor-
poration that would have justified piercing the corporate veil to hold Riv-
erview liable.7 Further, there was no showing of negligence, contractual
privity, or misrepresentation on the part of Riverview.7 2 Rather, the rec-
ord merely established that Riverview was an independently incorporated
realtor working for a disclosed principal, namely Watergate Improvements
Associates.73 Thus, relying on Vandermark, the court extended products
liability to realtors acting in their brokerage capacity for defects found by
the ultimate consumer.
There is some uncertainty, however, as to whether the majority intended
there is a liability imposed for injury caused by placing a defective product into the stream
of commerce in the District of Columbia" Id at 1357 (citing Cottom v. McGuire Funeral
Serv., Inc., 262 A.2d 807, 808-09 (1970)).
70. Generally, a corporation cannot be held liable for the activities or obligations of a
separately created and distinct legal entity. This is true even in the case of parent-subsidiary
corporations or in corporations related by common control and stock ownership. See, e.g.,
Overstreet v. Southern Ry. Co., 371 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 912
(1969) (distinct corporate entity will not be disregarded solely because of common corporate
names, stockholders and officers); Food Fair Stores v. Blumberg, 234 Md. 521, 200 A.2d 166
(1964) (mere fact that corporation owns majority of stock of another corporation does not
destroy separate legal identity). See also W. CARY, CORPORATIONS 109 (4th ed. 1969).
71. 391 A.2d at 1360 (Nebeker, J., dissenting). Distinct corporate personalities will be
disregarded when used to defeat public convenience, protect fraud, or justify wrong. See,
e.g., Vogel v. Bankers Bldg. Corp., 112 Cal. App. 2d 160, 245 P.2d 1069 (1952) (non-issu-
ance of stock coupled with fraud or bad faith will allow court to disregard corporate entity).
See also W. CARY, supra note 70, at 109.
72. Real estate brokers may be held liable to purchasers of property where there is
misrepresentation as to, or nondisclosure of physical defects in, the property sold. See, e.g.,
Saporta v. Barbagelata, 220 Cal. App. 2d 463, 33 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1963) (realtor held liable
for nondisclosure of termite damage known to him but unobservable by the purchaser);
Spagnapani v. Wright, 110 A.2d 82 (D.C. 1954) (realtor held liable in fraud to purchasers for
flagrantly inaccurate representation as to cost of heating a home). See generally Annot., 8
A.L.R.3d 550 (1969). A realtor may also be held liable when there is a breach of fiduciary
duty owed to the principal. See, e.g., Ornamental & Structural Steel Inc. v. BBG Inc., 20
Ariz. App. 16, 509 P.2d 1053 (1973) (realtor held liable to principal for disclosing material
defects in property to purchaser with consent of principal). See also Comment, The Real
Estate Broker-Purchaser Relationshp: Louisiana and Common Law, 52 TUL. L. REV. 157
(1977).
73. An agent of a disclosed principal may not be disclosed absent a showing of fraud or
misrepresentation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 320 (1970).
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to rule this broadly. The court paid close attention to the fact that both the
realtor and the cooperative were subsidiaries of the building's sponsor.7 4
Although there was nothing in the record alleging any alter ego relation-
ship, the court may have implicity relied on Mrs. Berman's pro se argu-
ment that the two defendants were actually coextensive with the project's
sponsor.75 Thus, a narrow interpretation of the court's holding would only
extend products liability to realtors formed as subsidiary agents of the
projects' sponsor.
If the majority intended to broaden the scope of this liability to include
an independent realtor, however, the court of appeals has misinterpreted
the role of a real estate agent and abandoned important policy considera-
tions underlying the products liability theory. The court justified its hold-
ing by analogizing Riverview's position in marketing apartments to that of
an ordinary retailer, and then applying the Vandermark chain of distribu-
tion theory.76 This theory, initially applied to retailers, is inapplicable to
realtors for several reasons. First, a realtor plays a substantially less inte-
gral part in the overall production and marketing enterprise than an ordi-
nary retailer or manufacturer. Essentially, the retailer is a seller while the
realtor is an agent. A realtor's function is to find a purchaser for the prin-
cipal's product,7 7 and acts only for and through the authority granted by
the principal, with no independent contracting authority.78 In addition,
the realtor neither owns the product he sells, nor participates in the chain
of title. On the other hand, the retailer plays a far more integral part in
transmitting the product to the consumer. The retailer is the owner and
title-holder of the goods. Thus, he is generally free to establish the terms
and conditions of purchase from the manufacturer and resale to the con-
sumer.79 This control affords the retailer significantly more economic
74. See 391 A.2d at 1351-55 (court engages in detailed discussion of the parties' rela-
tionship).
75. Id See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
76. 391 A.2d at 1359. The court did not discuss any of the distinctions or similarities
between retailers and realtors. Rather, the court simply concluded that because realtors
assist in putting the product on the market, they should be included in the scope of liability.
Id
77. See Gallagher v. Washington County Fed. Sav., Loan & Bldg. Co., 125 W. Va. 791,
798, 25 S.E.2d 914, 918 (1943). Accord, Crews v. Sullivan, 133 Va. 478, 482, 113 S.E. 865,
866 (1922).
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 55 (1970).
79. A retailer is a merchant who buys articles in gross or merchandise in large quanti-
ties and sells the same by single articles or in small quantities. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1479 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (citing Bryan v. City of Sparks 36 Nev. 573, 137 P. 522 (1914)).
Accord, Paper Products Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, 183 Pa. Super. Ct. 234, 246, 130 A.2d 219,
224 (1957).
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clout in bargaining with the manufacturer of the defective product and in
allocating the costs of products liability.
The policy considerations underlying the extension of products liability
to retailers as enunciated in Vandermark are likewise inapplicable to real-
tors. A primary justification advanced for imposing liability on all parties
in the distributional chain is to spur the parties to be more responsive to
the quality control and safety of the product. This rationalization assumes
that a particular defendant has in some way contributed to the defect, or at
least is in a position to exert economic pressure for stricter quality con-
trol.8" A real estate agent acting solely in a brokerage capacity, however, is
wholly removed from the production, control or possession of the defective
product and thus cannot be deemed a contributing cause of the defect.8 '
Consequently, by holding Riverview solely accountable for the defect in
the apartment, the court penalized the realtor for a defect it could not have
caused, leaving unscathed those parties who were primarily responsible.
In finding the realtor liable, the court might have reasoned that realtors
could have an indirect impact in discouraging the marketing of poorly
constructed homes. For example, a realtor may simply refuse to represent
any disreputable dealer of poorly constructed homes which he feels
presents an undue risk of products liability, thereby impeding the flow of
defective housing onto the market. This potential impact, however, is tem-
pered by several practical considerations. First, as in Berman, the realtor
dealing with a new builder and a new housing project may have no way to
ascertain the quality of construction and workmanship outside of an in-
dependent and costly inspection. This expense would ultimately be passed
on to consumers in the form of increased prices of homes or higher broker-
age fees. Second, given the crowded and competitive field of realty sales, it
seems unlikely that all realtors would refuse to market a home of question-
able quality merely due to a remote risk of a products liabilty action.82 In
80. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
81. With respect to retailers, there is a split of authority as to whether they may be held
strictly liable when they have in no way participated in the manufacturing process and when
the product leaves their control in exactly the same condition as they received it. Compare
McLeod v. W.S. Merrell Co., 174 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1965) (druggist not held strictly liable for
damages caused by drug sold in its original sealed package) and Sam Shaineburg Co. v.
Barlow, 258 So. 2d 242 (Miss. 1972) (retailer not held liable for damage caused by shoes sold
in same condition received from manufacturer) with Sams v. Ezy-Way Foodliner Co., 157
Me. 10, 170 A.2d 160 (1961) (retail grocer held liable for prepackaged frankfurter containing
particles of glass).
82. This risk of the realtor being held liable under a products liability theory is rela-
tively small since liability will generally not extend to the realtor until the plaintiff has
shown that s/he has no means of recovery against any of the parties who are primarily
responsible for the defect. See 391 A.2d at 1359. See text accompanying notes 89-92 infra.
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light of the minimal control exercised by realtors over the quality and
safety of the product, imposition of liability under both the facts and pol-
icy of Vandermark is unfounded.
Equally unfounded is the court's suggestion that the cooperative associa-
tion might also be liable if the parties primarily responsible for placing the
defective product on the market were beyond the reach of the injured
plaintiff.83 Likening the role of the cooperative to that of a landlord,84 the
court stated that liability might attach solely because of the cooperative's
superior ability to distribute and to insure against losses. The cooperative,
however, did not take title to the building until all construction had been
completed and the defective appliances installed. In these circumstances,
the cooperative was clearly outside the Vandermark chain of distribu-
tion.85 Moreover, imposing liability on Watergate West could in no way
encourage better quality in the construction of housing units since the
ultimate loss would be shared among the individual shareholders of the
cooperative (including plaintiff), none of whom were engaged in the man-
ufacture or marketing of the apartments. Clearly then, the court's ration-
ale rested on a policy decision that the additional protection afforded the
injured plaintiff outweighed the burden of imposing liability on a faultless
defendant. While such a policy is not necessarily misguided, it is inconsis-
tent with traditional products liability reasoning.
Finally, extension of liability to both the realtor and cooperative can be
challenged on the basis that the parties "primarily responsible" were not
beyond the reach of the plaintiff.86 In the present case, plaintiff never took
action against those parties primarily responsible for the damage to her
apartment-namely the builder, the sponsor, or the manufacturer of the
defective appliance.87 Although the project's builder, Watergate Construc-
tion Company, was dissolved shortly after completing the construction, the
project's sponsor, Watergate Improvements Associates, remained available
to the plaintiff throughout the proceeding.88 Nevertheless, plaintiff main-
83. 391 A.2d at 1359.
84. Although the court of appeals has previously analogized the role of a cooperative
association to that of a landlord, see, e.g., 1901 Wyoming Ave. Coop. Ass'n. v. Lee, 345 A.2d
456, 458 n.2 (D.C. 1975) (tenant action against cooperative for failure to repair plumbing),
there is a fundamental distinction between the two. A landlord owns and operates the build-
ing for profit, while the cooperative is generally a non-profit corporation that owns and
operates the building for the use, benefit and enjoyment of its members, all of whom are
shareholders in the corporation. See note 8 supra.
85. See notes 9-10 and accompanying text supra.
86. This consideration was instrumental in Vandermark's decision to extend products
liability beyond a mere manufacturer. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
87. Interview with Robert J. Wieferich, Attorney for Plaintiff (March 24, 1979).
88. Interview with Director, Watergate Improvements Associates (March 28, 1979).
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tained the breach of warranty theory as her sole cause of action against the
realtor and cooperative. While there may be some justification for finding
these secondary parties liable in the rare instances where all other potential
defendants are beyond the reach of the injured plaintiff,89 when nothing
stands in the way of recovering from the parties primarily responsible,
courts have declined to extend products liability to its farthest reach.90
Contrary to this general rule, the Berman decision suggests that one can
successfully recover from a realtor of defective housing without first, or at
least simultaneously, exhausting a remedy against the builder or sponsor.
In light of the realtor's minimal control over the construction and market-
ing of the defective product, a better approach would be to restrict the
realtor's liability to instances where all other defendants are beyond the
plaintiffs reach.
III. CONCLUSION
It is clear that the District of Columbia, in keeping with the modem and
better reasoned trend of recent decisions, has adopted the law of products
liability in the sale of mass-produced housing. Abandoning the common
law rule of caveat emptor, the court of appeals has remedied the imbalance
of bargaining power and legal recourse between the buyer and seller of a
new home, and has provided greater incentive for quality and workman-
like construction in the District of Columbia. By indicating on its face that
products liability for defective housing may be extended beyond builder-
vendors to independent realtors, however, the court has abrograted some
of the traditional policy considerations underlying products liability.
89. Traditionally, subsequently formed subsidiaries and successor corporations have
been free from liability for the acts and torts of their predecessors. Several recent decisions
have indicated, however, that these successor corporations may be liable when they continue
corporate activity in a manner similar to the parent or predecessor company and are the only
party reasonably available to the injured plaintiff. See, e.g., Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d
22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1977); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244
N.W.2d 873 (1976); Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 140 N.J. Super. 476, 356 A.2d 458 (1976).
See also Note, Expanding the Products Liability of Successor Corporations, 27 HASTINGS L.J.
1305 (1976).
90. 391 A.2d at 1359. Notably, it appears the statute of limitations would not have
barred plaintiff's cause of action against any of the parties in the chain of distribution. The
statute of limitations for actions arising out of injuries caused by defective or unsafe im-
provements to real property generally runs for ten years from the time the improvements are
substantially completed. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-310 (1973). Moreover, in agreements
under seal, as in the plaintiff's Proprietary Lease and Occupancy Agreement, this period
may be extended to twelve years. See Ramey v. Burrascano. 324 A.2d 687 (D.C. 1974).
Since the entire chronology of this action required less than ten years, see notes 8-13 and
accompanying text supra, it appears unlikely the statute of limitations would have precluded
the plaintiff from seeking recovery against those parties "primarily responsible."
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While such a decision will provide increased protection for the home
buyer against defective housing, it undoubtedly will lead to a significant
adjustment in the bargaining relationship between builders and realtors,
which ultimately will result in higher prices for new homes at a time when
the District of Columbia is already beseiged with a severe housing
shortage. Considering the uncertainty of the holding, coupled with its po-
tentially far reaching ramifications, Berman should be interpreted cau-
tiously in future decisions.
Joseph A. Lynoll
EVIDENCE-The District of Columbia Trial Courts Have
No Absolute Obligation Immediately to Issue, Sua
Sponte, an Instruction Limiting the Use of Prior
Inconsistent Statements. Johnson v. United States, 387
A.2d 1084 (D.C. 1978) (en bane).
Extrajudicial statements, known as hearsay, are generally not admissible
in court as substantive evidence because they do not have the same guar-
antees of reliability as statements made by witnesses testifying directly.'
Underlying this hearsay rule is the need to avoid prejudice to the parties
resulting from the jury's consideration of unreliable evidence.2 Exceptions
are permitted, however, when the out of court statement is shown to be
necessary and trustworthy.' Prior inconsistent statements,4 made out of
1. The prohibition against the use of out of court statements is generally known as the
hearsay rule. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 802. The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as
"a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." FED. R. EvID. 801(c). For
examples of statements that have been excluded as hearsay, see C. MCCORMICK, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 248 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
Nonverbal conduct can also be a form of hearsay. See note 23 infra.
2. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 153 (1945)(admission of hearsay statements
"would allow men to be convicted on unsworn testimony").
3. See Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 286 F.2d 388, 396-97 (5th Cir.
1961); FED. R. EvID. 803, 804 & Adv. Comm. Notes (codifying 29 exceptions). District of
Columbia law recognizes the more common of these exceptions, although they exist at com-
mon law rather than in statutory form. See McFadden v. United States, 395 A.2d 14 (D.C.
1978)(dying declarations); Gezmu v. United States, 375 A.2d 520 (D.C. 1977)(statements to
show present state of mind); Bennett v. United States, 375 A.2d 499 (D.C. 1977)(statements
which are circumstantial evidence of state of mind); Nicholson v. United States, 368 A.2d
561 (D.C. 1977)(spontaneous utterance). Compare Steadman v. United States, 358 A.2d
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court and technically within the hearsay rule, are not considered suffi-
ciently reliable as substantive evidence. To ensure the reliability of jury
verdicts,' however, they are admissible to impeach the credibility of a wit-
ness.6 In order to limit prior statements to this purpose, District of Colum-
bia Superior Court Rule 30 enables opposing counsel to request a jury
instruction, 7 confining the use of prior statements to evaluating the credi-
329, 331-32 (D.C. 1976)(statements against penal interest not admissible where there are no
corroborating circumstances to indicate trustworthiness) with FED. R. EVID.
804(b)(3)(statements against penal interest admissible as hearsay exception). See also D.C.
CODE ANN. § 14-303 (1973)(prior testimony of unavailable declarant admissible if same
parties and same subject matter). But see Epstein v. United States, 359 A.2d 274 (D.C.
1976)(evidence not admissible where issues in proceedings not substantially the same). See
general, CRIMINAL PRACTICE INSTITUTE TRIAL MANUAL 15.2-.23 (D.C. Bar Ass'n
1978)[hereinafter cited as TRIAL MANUAL]. For additional examples of hearsay exceptions
recognized in the District of Columbia, see note 6 infra.
4. Prior inconsistent statements are defined as any statements made prior to the pres-
ent trial, either oral or written, that contradict present testimony. Also included is conduct
that evidences a belief inconsistent with the statements made at trial. Such statements or
conduct are used to undermine a witness's credibility by showing that he has made one
statement on the witness stand and a contradictory statement at a previous time. For pur-
poses of attacking credibility, the truth of either statement is neither material nor presumed.
See Brooks v. United States, 309 F.2d 580, 582 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 916
(1966); MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 34 & n.7.
5. For discussion of limited purpose evidence and limiting instructions see note 8 infra.
6. See Jones v. United States, 385 F.2d 296 (D.C. Cir. 1967)(per curiam); Coleman v.
United States, 371 F.2d 343 (D.C. Cir. 1966)(per curiam), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 (1967);
Byrd v. United States, 342 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Bartley v. United States, 319 F.2d 717
(D.C. Cir. 1963); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-102 (1973). Cf. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A)(prior
inconsistent statements nonhearsay) and notes 94-97 and accompanying text infra. In the
District of Columbia use of prior inconsistent statements against one's own witness is specifi-
cally limited by D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-102 (1973). See notes 31-32 and accompanying text
infira.
In addition to prior inconsistent statements, the Federal Rules of Evidence have varied
from the common law by classifying as nonhearsay other extrajudicial statements that fall
within the traditional definition. Compare Clemons v. United States, 408 F.2d 1230 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 964 (1969)(prior identifications admitted as hearsay excep-
tion if declarant is available for cross-examination) with FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C)(prior
identifications are nonhearsay if declarant is available for cross-examination); Coltrane v.
United States, 418 F.2d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1969)(prior consistent statements of witness are not
admissible unless witness' credibility has been impeached) with FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(1)(B)(prior consistent statement admissible as nonhearsay to rebut charge of recent
fabrication); Smith v. United States, 312 A.2d 781 (D.C. 1973)(admission of party-opponent
admissible as hearsay exception) with FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(admissions of party opponent
admissible as nonhearsay).
7. SuP. CT. R. CRIM. 30, which is identical to FED. R. CRIM. P. 30, states in pertinent
part:
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the trial. . . any party
may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in
the requests. . . . No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omis-
sion therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its ver-
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bility of a witness.8 Absent this request, the federal and District of Colum-
bia appellate courts have, under a separate rule,9 required judges to issue a
sua sponte instruction at the time the statement is offered to preserve the
party's right to a fair trial."l In Johnson v. United States," the Court of
dict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his
objection.
For a discussion of Rule 30, see note 13 and accompanying text infra.
8. Limiting instructions are necessary to restrict multipurpose evidence to its permissi-
ble use. See, e.g., United States v. McClain, 440 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1971)(prior bad acts
evidence limited to show malice); Dixon v. United States, 287 A.2d 89 (D.C.), cert. denied,
407 U.S. 926 (1972)(prior conviction evidence limited to issue of credibility of defendant).
These instructions represent a compromise that permits the jury to receive an relevant evi-
dence while safeguarding against its being used for an impermissible purpose. See FED. R.
EVID. 105; MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 59; 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE 105[02], 105[05]; 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 13 (3d ed. 1940). See generally
Note, Evidence Admissible for a Limited Purpose-The Risk of Confusion Upsetting the Bal-
ance ofAdvantage, 16 SYR. L. REV. 81 (1964). For a discussion of the continuing validity of
limiting instructions, see notes 81-84 and accompanying text infra.
The standard jury instruction in the District of Columbia on the limited use of prior in-
consistent statements reads:
The testimony of a witness may be discredited or impeached by showing that he
has previously made statements which are inconsistent with his present testimony.
Such prior statements are admitted into evidence solely for your consideration in
evaluating the credibility of the witness. Should you find the prior statements to be
inconsistent, you may consider such statements only in connection with your evalu-
ation of the truth of the witness's present testimony in court. You must not con-
sider the prior statement as establishing the truth of any fact contained in that
statement.
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA No. 1.06 (D.C. Bar Ass'n
3d ed. 1978)[hereinafter cited as CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS]. Cf. PATTERN JURY IN-
STRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) No. 7A (prepared by Committee on Pattern Jury Instruc-
tions, District Judges Ass'n 5th Cir. 1978)(contains no warning that jury may not use prior
inconsistent statements for truth contained therein).
9. SUP. CT. R. CRIM. 52(b), which is identical to FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b), states "[pilain
errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought
to the attention of the court." For a discussion of Rule 52(b), see note 15 and accompanying
text infra.
10. See United States v. Leonard, 494 F.2d 955 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Gil-
liam, 484 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Jones v. United States, 385 F.2d 296 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
(per curiam); Coleman v. United States, 371 F.2d 343 (D.C. Cir. 1966)(per curiam), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 945 (1967); Lofty v. United States, 277 A.2d 99 (D.C. 1971), and notes 31-
43, 53-56 and accompanying text infra. See generally TRIAL MANUAL, supra note 3, at
15.48-.51; CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 8, at 1.055, .06 & Comment. See also
United States v. Sisto, 534 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Lipscomb, 425 F.2d 226
(6th Cir. 1970). This sua sponte obligation has been expanded by the D.C. courts to apply
whenever evidence is used for a limited purpose, thereby creating per se plain error when-
ever the trial judge fails to issue such an instruction. See United States v. McClain, 440 F.2d
241 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Lofty v. United States, 277 A.2d 99 (D.C. 1971). See notes 45-56 and
accompanying text infra. See also United States v. Diaz, 585 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1978)(judge
has duty to issue instruction limiting use of prior conviction evidence when prior conviction
is for same crime).
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Appeals for the District of Columbia recently abolished the absolute obli-
gation to issue limiting instructions and directed future courts to determine
the need for such instructions on a case-by-case basis.
Johnson and two co-defendants, Allen and Smallwood, were charged
with armed robbery. At trial, Allen admitted his own involvement in the
robbery and offered testimony exculpating Johnson. The arresting officer,
testifying for the government, related a statement Allen had made immedi-
ately after his arrest, in which he named Johnson as a primary participant
in the robbery. 2 Allen's prior statement, therefore, contradicted his own
sworn testimony at trial. Johnson's attorney neither requested a limiting
instruction at the time the evidence was offered, nor objected to the court's
final charge to the jury, as required under Rule 30 of the District of Co-
lumbia Superior Court Rules, Criminal Division.' 3 Although the final
charge included a general instruction that prior inconsistent statements
11. 387 A.2d 1084 (D.C. 1978)(en banc).
12. Id at 1085. Allen had stated that Johnson had been under the effects of narcotics
withdrawal and was therefore oblivious to the fact that a robbery was taking place. Id
13. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 364 A.2d 813, 816 (D.C. 1976). For the text of
Rule 30, see note 7 supra.
The general rule in the federal jurisdictions is that, in order to raise the issue on appeal,
counsel must have either requested a limiting instruction or objected to its absence before
the close of the trial. See, e.g., United States v. Solomon, 422 F.2d 1110, 1114 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970); Wilson v. Wiman, 386 F.2d 968, 970 (6th Cir. 1967), cer. de-
nied, 390 U.S. 1042 (1968); United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904, 912 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 873 (1966); Nutt v. United States, 335 F.2d 817, 819 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 909 (1964); Newman v. United States, 331 F.2d 968, 971 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. de-
nied, 397 U.S. 975 (1965); Dirring v. United States, 328 F.2d 512, 515 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 1003 (1964); Sica v. United States, 325 F.2d 831, 836 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 952 (1964); Smoot v. United States, 312 F.2d 881, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Blakeley v.
United States, 249 F.2d 235, 236 (5th Cir. 1957)(per curiam). Rule 105 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence has also been interpreted as requiring counsel to request the limiting instruc-
tion. See FED. R. EvID. 105 ("the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence"). This
requirement does not preclude the trial judge from issuing an instruction sua sponte if he
determines one is necessary to avoid plain error. See I WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 8,
at 105[01]; C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, Evidence §
5065 (1977).
Although federal appellate decisions are not necessarily binding upon the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals, see note 34, infra, they provide guidance for interpretation of
Superior Court Rules when those rules are "literally or substantively identical" to the fed-
eral rules. Cooper v. United States, 353 A.2d 696, 701 n. II (D.C. 1975). Since SuP. CT. R.
CRIM. 30 is identical to FED. R. CRIM. P. 30, these decisions are persuasive authority for
District of Columbia Court of Appeals decisions.
The purpose of the rule is to allow the trial judge an opportunity to correct any errors in
his charge that might require a new trial. See United States v. Indiviglio, 352 F.2d 276, 280
(2d Cir. 1965), cerl. denied, 383 U.S. 907 (1966); Villaroman v. United States, 184 F.2d 261,
262 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Watts v. United States, 362 A.2d 706, 708-09 (D.C. 1976)(en banc). See
also FED. R. EvID. 103(a) & Adv. Comm. Notes.
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could only be used for impeachment purposes, there was no specific refer-
ence to the arresting officer's testimony.' 4
On appeal, Johnson argued that Allen's prior statement was hearsay,
admissible only for determining Allen's credibility and not for the truth of
the testimony. He maintained that although counsel had made no objec-
tion to the instructions at trial, the court was permitted by Rule 52(b) of
the Superior Court Rules to notice plain errors affecting substantial
rights.' 5 Relying on prior District of Columbia court interpretations of
this rule requiring a sua sponte limiting instruction at the time such evi-
dence is offered, Johnson argued that the trial court had committed plain
error by failing to issue the instruction. Judge Kelly, writing for the major-
ity of the three-judge panel, reversed the conviction, holding that the trial
court's failure had substantially prejudiced Johnson's right to a fair trial. 6
Three months later, the appellate court granted the government's petition
for a rehearing en banc.'7
14. 387 A.2d at 1085.
15. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 362 A.2d 706, 708n.3 (D.C. 1976)(en banc). For
the text of rule 52(b), see note 9 supra. The federal courts under FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) are
also permitted to notice errors affecting substantial rights not objected to at trial. See, e.g.,
United States v. Sisto, 534 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Leonard, 494 F.2d 955
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Chubet v. United States, 414 F.2d 1018 (8th Cir. 1969); Heroz v. United
States, 226 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 844 (1956). See also WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, supra note 13 at Criminal § 856. However, these rules do not eliminate the re-
quirement that a timely objection be made. See United States v. Graydon, 429 F.2d 120,
123-24 (4th Cir. 1970). The corresponding provision in the Federal Rules of Evidence is
substantially the same. See FED. R. EvID. 103(d) & Adv. Comm. Notes.
The purpose of the plain error rule is to protect both the rights of the defendant and the
judicial integrity of the courts. There does not seem to be any single definition of plain
error; it is a concept more easily recognized by courts than defined. WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
supra note 13, at Criminal § 856. See, e.g., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 760-61
(1946)(the object of the rule was "to substitute judgment for automatic application of rules";
the "task was too big, too various in detail, for particularized treatment"); United States v.
Barcenas, 498 F.2d 1110, 1113 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1036 (1974)(plain error is
determined by facts and circumstances of each case). See also Gibbs, Prejudicial Error.- Ad-
missions and Exclusions of Evidence in the Federal Courts, 3 VILL. L. REV. 48 (1957). For a
discussion of the standards applied under the plain error rule, see notes 74-79 and accompa-
nying text infra.
16. Johnson v. United States, 356 A.2d 639 (D.C. 1976), rev'd, 387 A.2d 1084 (D.C.
1978)(en banc).
17. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, General Rules 40(c) provides that:
A majority of the judges who are in regular active service may order that an appeal
or other proceeding be heard or reheard by the court in banc. Such a hearing or
rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered except (1) when consid-
eration by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its deci-
sions, or (2) when the proceedings involves [sic] a question of exceptional
importance.
Relying principally on Rule 40(c)(l), the government, in its petition for a rehearing, urged
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Upon reconsideration, the court found that failure to issue an immediate
limiting instruction did not constitute plain error, and reversed its prior
decision. Judge Yeagley, writing for the seven member majority, urged a
strict interpretation of the Rule 30 requirement that errors not be judicially
noticed on appeal unless counsel had requested limiting instructions dur-
ing the course of the trial. Although recognizing that Rule 52(b) permits
exceptions when the failure to give an instruction substantially prejudices
the rights of a party, the court found that the obligation of the trial judge
to issue instructions without request of counsel, as established by District
of Columbia case law, went beyond the appropriate scope of the sua
sponte exception."8 Based on its finding that the limiting instruction in the
final charge to the jury had been sufficient to prevent substantial
prejudice,19 the court concluded that Johnson did not fit within the Rule
52(b) exception to Rule 30.
Judge Kelly, joined by Judge Mack in dissent,2° agreed with the major-
ity's articulation of the general rule, but objected to the court's factual de-
termination of insubstantial prejudice.2" Reasoning that the general jury
instructions were inadequate to prevent the jury's use of the prior inconsis-
tent statement as substantive evidence, Judge Kelly concluded that this
was sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal.2 2 Johnson's strict reading
of Rule 30 will undoubtedly create the benefit of eliminating a substantial
number of unnecessary retrials. Additionally it will increase the possibility
of undue prejudice to defendants by permitting the inadvertent admission
of hearsay evidence. Given these conflicting results, the value of Johnson
that the majority's decision in Johnson was inconsistent with prior holdings, and that over-
ruling Lofty v. United States, 277 A.2d 99 (D.C. 1971), was necessary to insure uniformity in
future decisions. Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 1-2, Johnson v. United States, 356 A.2d
639 (D.C. 1976), rev'd, 387 A.2d 1084 (D.C. 1978)(en banc). The District of Columbia Court
of Appeals, in its order granting the rehearing en banc, did not articulate the reasons for its
decision. However, the subsequent reversal may indicate that the court felt the earlier dispo-
sition had improperly deviated from the settled rule of law.
18. 387 A.2d at 1086-88. This interpretation is consistent with strict construction of the
plain error exception to Rule 30 required by most jurisdictions. See, e.g., United States v.
Bermudez, 526 F.2d 89, 96-97 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 970 (1976); United States
v. Conley, 523 F.2d 650, 654 n.7 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 920 (1976); United
States v. Valencia, 492 F.2d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. King, 420 F.2d 946,
947 (4th Cir.)(per curiam), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1017 (1970). For a discussion of the excep-
tions which the court deemed permissible, see note 71 and accompanying text infra.
19. 387 A.2d at 1089.
20. Judges Kelly and Mack were the same judges who comprised the two-member ma-
jority of the first Johnson opinion.
21. 387 A.2d at 1090 (Kelly, J., dissenting). The dissenters considered this to be the
central issue of the case and were critical of the majority's failure to accord it similar impor-
tance. Id at 1090 n.l. See note 73 and accompanying text infra.
22. 387 A.2d at 1090 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
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depends on whether the benefits to the judicial system compensate for any
impediments to defendants' rights to a fair trial.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUA SPONTE REQUIREMENT
Hearsay, an extrajudicial statement offered at trial as substantive evi-
dence,23 is not subject to the guarantees provided when the witness is pres-
ent on the stand,24 subject to an oath2 5 and cross-examination.26
Consequently, such statements may furnish less reliable evidence. Prior
inconsistent statements, made out of court and thus substantively unrelia-
ble,27 are admissible in the District of Columbia only for impeaching the
23. See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 246; 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1361
(Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974).
The statement can be written or oral, or may consist of nonverbal conduct so long as it is
intended as an assertion. See FED. R. EvID. 801(a); MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 246.
Conduct is considered to be assertive when the act is the equivalent of words and the intent
of the act is to make a statement, the truth of which is offered as evidence. See, e.g., FED. R.
EVID. 801(a) & Adv. Comm. Notes; MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 250 & n.34 (pointing to
a suspect in a line-up to identify him). Nonassertive conduct is circumstantial evidence of a
condition sought to be proved at trial even though the actor did not intend to assert that
condition. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 801(a) & Adv. Comm. Notes; MCCORMICK, supra note
1, at § 250 & n.36 (measures taken by family offered to show that person was insane). Extra-
judicial statements which are not considered hearsay include verbal acts, such as oral state-
ments of offer and acceptance between contracting parties, and verbal parts of acts which are
explanatory words that accompany and clarify a transaction. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) &
Adv. Comm. Notes; MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 249.
24. The presence of the witness at trial permits the trier of fact to observe the witness's
demeanor while testifying, which provides information for evaluating his credibility. See
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895); NLRB v. Dinion Coil Co., 201 F.2d
484, 487 (2d Cir. 1952); Broadcast Music Inc. v. Havana Madrid Restaurant Corp., 175 F.2d
77, 80 (2d Cir. 1949); MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 245. See generally Sahm, Demeanor
Evidence: Elusive and Intangible Imponderables, 47 A.B.A.J. 580 (1961). In all civil pro-
ceedings the federal courts require that "the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in
open court, unless otherwise provided. . . by these rules .... " FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a).
25. The oath requirement serves two functions. Its ceremonial and religious aspects
create an obligation within the witness to speak the truth. It also apprises him of the danger
of criminal prosecution for perjury. See Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the
Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 185-88 (1948); MCCORMICK, supra note I, at § 245.
But see 5 WIGMORE, supra note 23, at § 1362 (oath requirement incidental). The Federal
Rules of Evidence have relaxed the oath requirement at trial so that an affirmation, a "sol-
emn undertaking to tell the truth," is also acceptable. FED. R. EvID. 603 & Adv. Comm.
Notes.
26. Cross-examination is the opportunity afforded opposing counsel to probe a witness
about the substance of his direct testimony and to ask questions designed to raise doubts
about his credibility. By testing the recollection of the witness, cross-examination exposes
faults in his perception and memory. Consequently, it is generally agreed to be the primary
factor in assuring the trustworthiness of testimony. See Morgan, supra note 25, at 186, 188;
MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at §§ 19, 245; 5 WIGMORE, supra note 23, at §§ 1362, 1367-68.
27. For opposing viewpoints, see notes 94-97 and accompanying text infra.
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credibility of a witness.2" Accordingly, the District of Columbia courts
have required that the jury be informed of the limited use of these state-
ments sometime during the trial to prevent undue prejudice resulting from
the improper consideration of their contents.29 It was not until Coleman v.
United States3" that the courts extended this rule to require a sua sponte
instruction at the time the testimony is offered.
In Coleman, the government sought to impeach two of its own witnesses
by offering prior statements contradicting their testimony at trial. This was
permissible under section 14-102 of the District of Columbia Code,3' pro-
vided the government made a satisfactory showing of surprise.32 The de-
28. The District of Columbia adheres to the orthodox rule that prior inconsistent state-
ments may only be used to impeach the credibility of a witness. They cannot be used to
support the truth of their contents. See note 6 supra.
29. See Byrd v. United States, 342 F.2d 939, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1965)(error to fail to instruct
jury regarding use of prior statements offered by government against defense witness); Bar-
tley v. United States, 319 F.2d 117, 719-20 (D.C. Cir. 1963)(reversal for failure to instruct
jury either immediately or in final charge regarding use of prior statements offered against
own witness).
30. 371 F.2d 343 (D.C. Cir. 1966)(per curiam), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 (1967). The
need for a sua sponte instruction was previously considered by the court in Wheeler v.
United States, 211 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1019 (1954). The court
reasoned that the final charge to the jury regarding the use of prior statements was suffi-
ciently clear to prevent their being used as substantive evidence. Id at 26. The court did,
however, acknowledge that an immediate instruction would have been desirable. Id at 26
n.17.
31. D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-102 (1973) states:
When the court is satisfied that the party producing a witness has been taken by
surprise by the testimony of the witness, it may allow the party to prove, for the
purpose only of affecting the credibility of the witness, that the witness has made
• . . statements substantially variant from his sworn testimony about material facts
in the cause.
This rule codifies District of Columbia common law relating to the impeachment of one's
own witness. See Smith v. United States, 17 F.2d 223, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1927). The common
law rule presumed that the party calling the witness vouched for his honesty and reliability.
This rule, however, has been rejected in the federal courts since it is based on the false
assumption that a party has a free choice in selecting his witnesses. See United States v.
Freeman, 302 F.2d 347 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 958 (1963); FED. R. EVID. 607 &
Adv. Comm. Notes (party may impeach the credibility of any witness called). See also
United States v. Norman, 518 F.2d 1176, 1177 (4th Cir. 1975)(per curiam)(rule against im-
peaching own witness "archaic, irrational and potentially destructive of the truth-gathering
process"); E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 69-71 (1962)(rule against impeach-
ing own witness irrational). See generally 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 8, at
$ 607[0 1]; Hauser, Impeaching One's Own Witness, 11 OHIO ST. L.J. 364 (1950); Ladd, Im-
peachment of One's Own Witness, 4 U. Cm. L. REV. 69 (1936).
32. The party seeking to impeach its own witness must approach the bench, explain
why he anticipated different testimony, and request permission to examine the witness re-
garding the prior inconsistent statement. See TRIAL MANUAL, supra note 3, at 15.50. The
concept of surprise is a broad one; normally, the court's ruling on surprise may not be over-
turned unless it is clear that there was no rational basis for the decision. Wheeler v. United
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fense did not request a limiting instruction at the time the evidence was
admitted, nor did the trial judge issue such an instruction. On appeal, the
defendant argued that this failure by the trial judge was plain error requir-
ing reversal.33 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed the conviction,34 concluding that the final charge to the jury was
adequate to prevent substantial prejudice.35 It held prospectively, how-
ever, that the trial court must issue an immediate limiting instruction when
prior inconsistent statements were offered to impeach a party's own wit-
ness.36 The majority concluded that the defendant's right to a fair trial
and the desirability of avoiding unnecessary retrials were sufficiently com-
pelling to take the responsibility for the limiting instruction away from the
attorney and place it with the trial judge. 7
This prospective ruling was affirmed one year later by the same court in
Jones v. United States.3" Facing facts similar to those in Coleman,39 the
States, 211 F.2d 19, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1019 (1954). See, e.g., Davis
v. United States, 370 A.2d 1337, 1340 (D.C.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 853 (1977)(defense not
permitted to claim surprise if it had previous opportunity to cross-examine witness at trial);
Parker v. United States, 363 A.2d 975, 977 (D.C. 1976)(surprise even though prosecution
had been informed by defense counsel before trial that witness's testimony would be incon-
sistent); Baker v. United States, 324 A.2d 194, 198 (D.C. 1974)(no surprise if prosecutor
knows witness has sworn to different facts during testimony at prior trial).
33. 371 F.2d at 344-45. Appellant additionally argued that the trial court incorrectly
permitted the prosecutor to read to the jury the entire contents of the prior statements. The
reviewing court rejected this argument, reasoning that the trial court had discretion to admit
as much of the statement as it deemed necessary. Id at 345 (relying on Wheeler v. United
States, 211 F.2d 19, 25-26 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1019 (1954)).
34. The precedential value of D.C. Circuit decisions in the D.C. Court of Appeals de-
pends on the date of the decision. Under the District of Columbia Court Reorganization
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 111, tit. I, 84 Stat. 475 (codified at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-
101 to 11-199 (1973)), the D.C. Court of Appeals is the highest court of the District of Co-
lumbia, subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States. Id § 11-102. Conse-
quently, the Court of Appeals is not bound by D.C. Circuit opinions after Feb. 1, 1971, the
effective date of the Act. Circuit Court opinions prior to that date, however, remain binding
case law unless the Court of Appeals, en banc, overrules or refuses to follow these decisions.
See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. 1971). See also Thompson v. United States,
548 F.2d 1031, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Simmons, 302 A.2d 728, 732 (D.C.
1973); District of Columbia v. Smith, 297 A.2d 787, 789 (D.C. 1972)(per curiam).
35. 371 F.2d at 345.
36. Id at 346. The court noted the inherent difficulty in effectuating the intention of §
14-102 to limit the use of prior inconsistent statements to the issue of credibility. Although
the statute is silent as to limiting instructions, the court reasoned that the privilege it pro-
vides must be coupled with an immediate cautionary instruction if the legislative intent was
to be fulfilled. Id at 345-46.
37. Id at 346.
38. 385 F.2d 296 (D.C. Cir. 1967)(per curiam).
39. The government, pursuant to § 14-102, introduced prior inconsistent statements to
impeach its own witness. The defense neither requested a limiting instruction at the time the
evidence was offered, nor objected to the final charge to the jury. Appellant argued on
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Jones court used a two-step analysis in its per curiam decision. First, the
court reasoned that use of prior statements to impeach one's own witness
necessitated a limiting instruction at some point during the trial in order to
prevent substantial prejudice. 40 Relying on its holding in Coleman, the
court then concluded that only an immediate sua sponte instruction could
effectively limit the jury's use of the statement. 41 The court went on to
discuss whether an immediate limiting instruction, sua sponte, was re-
quired for prior statements used to impeach a witness called by opposing
counsel.42 Noting that prior statements are generally unreliable evidence,
admissible only for impeachment purposes, the court concluded that the
sua sponte rule in Coleman should apply whenever a prior inconsistent
statement is offered, regardless of whose witness is testifying.
4 3
appeal that the failure of the trial judge to issue a limiting instruction sua sponte was plain
error. The government countered that appellant's silence at trial was a tactical choice and,
therefore, a waiver of any objection. Noting that the record was silent as to any tactical
choice by appellant, the court rejected the government's contention, stating that appellant's
use of the contradiction on recross-examination negated any claim that he chose to avoid
calling the jury's attention to an embarrassing piece of evidence. Id at 298-99.
40. Id at 298-99. The court relied on Bartley v. United States, 319 F.2d 717, 719 (D.C.
Cir. 1963), which cited Wheeler v. United States, 211 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 1019 (1954), for the rule that a limiting instruction is required both at the time the
evidence is offered and in the final charge to the jury. A careful reading of the Wheeler
opinion, however, does not reveal this language. In fact, the issue of sua sponte instructions
was not the primary focus of the case. Thus, the Bartley court's reliance on Wheeler may
have been misplaced.
41. 385 F.2d at 299. The court could have reached the same decision without relying on
Coleman, given its finding that the jury's possible reliance on the contents of the prior state-
ments was sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal. Id at 300 n.15.
42. The government had urged that the witness was, in fact, a defense witness when the
government introduced the prior statements. Consequently, the interpretation of § 14-102
requiring an immediate sua sponte instruction for prior statements used to impeach one's
own witness would not be applicable. To reach this conclusion, the government argued that
the defense had raised a new matter by questioning the witness about the prior statements
during cross-examination. The court rejected this argument, noting that the government
had initially raised the issue of the prior statements during its direct examination. 385 F.2d
at 299.
43. Id at 300. The court limited this requirement to extrajudicial statements by non-
party witnesses. Id Under D.C. law, statements by a party are admissions, admissible as
substantive evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. See, e.g., Smith v. United States,
312 A.2d 781 (D.C. 1973)(testimony by police officer that he heard defendant threaten a
witness). See generally TRIAL MANUAL, supra note 3, at 15.20-.22. Admissions are the
statements or conduct of a party, or his representative, which are offered into evidence
against him. See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 262; 4 WIGMORE, supra note 23, at § 1048;
FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2) & Adv. Comm. Notes. They are admissible as substantive evidence
under the theory that any relevant conduct by a party can be used as evidence against him.
"A party can hardly object that he had no opportunity to cross-examine himself or that he is
unworthy of credence save when speaking under sanction of an oath." MORGAN, supra note
31, at 266.
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Although Jones has been subsequently cited for the proposition that an
immediate sua sponte instruction is required whenever a prior inconsistent
statement is offered to impeach a witness's credibility,' this rule was sub-
sequently expanded to include an instruction for any evidence offered for a
limited purpose. In United States v. McClain,4" evidence of prior fights
between the defendant and his wife was introduced to show malice.46 No
limiting instruction was given at the time the evidence was offered and
none was requested. The majority reasoned that the prejudice resulting
from unrestricted use of this prior bad acts evidence47 created a plain error
exception to the rule requiring requests for instructions during the trial.
Rather than reversing solely on the finding of substantial prejudice,48 the
court relied upon Jones to hold that "whenever evidence is admitted only
for a limited purpose, it is plain error, in the absence of manifest waiver,49
In the federal courts, admissions by a party-opponent are also admissible for the truth of
the statement but are defined as non-hearsay. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). See, e.g., United
States v. Dimitroff, 541 F.2d 629, 632 (6th Cir. 1976)(defendant's affidavit); United States v.
Velarde, 528 F.2d 387, 389 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 914 (1976)(statement made
by defendant to police officer at time of arrest). For a discussion of other forms of non-
hearsay, see note 23 supra.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Leonard, 494 F.2d 955, 964-65 (D.C. Cir. 1974)(prior
inconsistent statement used to impeach co-defendant); United States v. Gilliam, 484 F.2d
1093, 1096-97 (D.C. Cir. 1973)(statements used by government to impeach hostile witness);
Johnson v. United States, 356 A.2d 639, 641 (D.C. 1976), rev'd, 387 A.2d 1084 (D.C.
1978)(en banc)(statements used by government to impeach co-defendant).
45. 440 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
46. The government sought to elicit this testimony during its direct examination of de-
fendant's daughter. Following an objection by the defense, the court ruled that this evidence
of prior acts of violence was not admissible. The government was later permitted to intro-
duce this evidence over objection by defense, however, because the defense had questioned
the witness during cross-examination about altercations between her parents. Id at 242-44.
47. Evidence of prior bad acts is not admissible as substantive evidence because of the
prejudice resulting from the jury's inference that the defendant tends to act in conformity
with those prior acts. However, prior acts evidence may be introduced as evidence of motive
or intent, accident, absence of mistake, common scheme or plan, or identity if its probative
value outweighs prejudice to the defendant. See Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 89-90
(D.C. Cir. 1964). See also Tinsley v. United States, 368 A.2d 531 (D.C. 1976); Light v.
United States, 360 A.2d 479 (D.C. 1976). See generally TRIAL MANUAL, supra note 3, at
15.23-.35. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) & Adv. Comm. Notes (prior acts evidence may be
introduced to show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident).
48. The dissent, written by Judge MacKinnon, questioned whether the introduction of
prior bad acts evidence without a limiting instruction resulted in any prejudice to the de-
fendant. He first stated that the prior bad acts evidence actually showed that defendant and
his wife fought infrequently, not frequently. He added that it was not prejudicial if defense
counsel made it possible for this evidence to be introduced. 440 F.2d at 247-48.
49. For a determination of manifest waiver the court required an explicit statement that
the particular instruction was not desired and a clear showing on the record that the waiver
was made for tactical reasons. Id at 245. See United States v. Francisco, 410 F.2d 1283,
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to omit an immediate cautionary instruction. '"50 McClain, therefore, cre-
ated a per se rule requiring reversal for any failure of the trial court to sua
sponte limit the use of multi-purpose evidence.
This broad rule sets the District of Columbia Circuit Court apart from
other federal jurisdictions. Rather than requiring an immediate sua sponte
instruction for any evidence offered for a limited purpose, the other federal
courts prefer to make case-by-case determinations of prejudice sufficient to
justify such an instruction." Perhaps aware of its radical position, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit has rarely invoked its own rule, instead dis-
tinguishing McClain as involving evidence and circumstances more
prejudicial than presented in subsequent cases. 2
1289 (8th Cir. 1969)(defense counsel expressly refused limiting instructions to avoid evi-
dence being called to jury's attention any further); Troublefield v. United States, 372 F.2d
912, 918-19 (D.C. Cir. 1967)(defense counsel expressly rejected a limiting instruction). See
also Jones v. United States, 385 F.2d 296, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1967)(per curiam)(counsel's use of
contradictory statement negates implication that failure to request was waiver of the instruc-
tion); Sica v. United States, 325 F.2d 831, 837 (9th Cir. 1963) (Foley, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 952 (1964)(failure to request does not constitute waiver). But see United
States v. Rothman, 463 F.2d 488, 489-90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 956 (1972)(failure to
request instructions and failure to object to their absence constitutes waiver); United States
v. King, 420 F.2d 946, 947 (4th Cir.)(per curiam), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1017 (1970)(failure
to request presumed to be tactical choice to waive instruction). But cf. United States v.
Howard, 433 F.2d 505, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1970)(failure to state specific reasons for objections to
jury instructions presumed to be waiver).
50. 440 F.2d at 246. Judge Bazelon found the case at bar to be identical to the problem
presented in Jones. Id Although the degree of prejudice may be indistinguishable, the type
of prejudice is not. Jones involved the use of a prior statement to impeach the credibility of
the government's own witness. The purpose of the limiting instruction was to avoid the
inadvertent admission of hearsay. In McClain, the evidence offered was specific instances of
prior conduct. In that case, the purpose of the limiting instruction was to prevent the jury
from drawing inferences about the character of the defendant.
51. See, e.g., United States v. James, 505 F.2d 898, 901 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1000 (1975); United States v. Johnson, 415 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1019 (1970). But see United States v. Dye, 508 F.2d 1226, 1234-35 (6th Cir. 1974), cer.
denied, 420 U.S. 974 (1975)(general rule that failure to give limiting instructions for use of
extrajudicial statements is plain error).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 514 F.2d 1314, 1317 & n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1975)(po-
tential prejudice of hearsay testimony concerning identity less obvious); United States v.
Lee, 509 F.2d 400, 406-07 & n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1006 (1975)(evi-
dence of prior convictions and prior guilty plea for unrelated offense less prejudicial because
instruction in final charge related to specific evidence); United States v. Fench, 470 F.2d
1234, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 909 (1973)(evidence of prior suspicious
acts not as inflammatory); United States v. Mizzell, 452 F.2d 1328, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1971)(ev-
idence involved prior legal conduct of complainant, not defendant's prior bad conduct). See
also United States v. Thomas, 459 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1972)(per curiam)(evidence
admitted for multiple purposes, not single purpose as in McClain). Even Judge Bazelon, the
author of the McClain opinion, has acknowledged its erosion. See United States v. Free-
man, 514 F.2d 1314, 1317 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Henson, 486 F.2d 1292,
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The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, however, agreed
with the McClain court's conclusion that a broad sua sponte rule was the
more effective way to prevent substantial prejudice. Accordingly, in Lofty
v. United States,53 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals adopted this
federal rule by applying it to prior inconsistent statements. In Lofty, as in
Coleman and Jones, the government introduced prior statements to im-
peach its own witness. Although no immediate instruction was requested
or given, the court gave a final charge to the jury, instructing it to consider
the prior statements only in evaluating the credibility of the witness, not as
evidence of the defendant's guilt.54 On appeal, the majority reversed, cit-
ing Coleman as requiring an immediate sua sponte instruction.55 Addi-
tionally, the court relied on McClain to hold that the omission of an
immediate sua sponte instruction whenever any evidence was admitted for
a limited purpose was plain error.56 Thus, Lofty suggests that the court
created a per se rule of plain error in the District of Columbia for failure of
the trial court to issue a sua sponte limiting instruction for any evidence
introduced for a limited purpose. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals, in a
case involving prior conviction evidence, limited rather than followed the
Lofty holding.
In Dixon v. United States,57 the government introduced evidence of the
defendant's prior larceny conviction, limiting its use to impeachment pur-
poses. A limiting instruction was not requested at any time by counsel, nor
was any given until the trial judge's final charge to the jury.58 On appeal,
the defendant, relying on Lofty, argued that lack of an immediate sua
1310 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1973)(Bazelon, C.J., concurring and dissenting). But see United States v.
Leonard, 494 F.2d 955, 964-65 (D.C. Cir. 1974)(McClain cited for proposition that any im-
peachment evidence requires an immediate limiting instruction); United States v. Gilliam,
484 F.2d 1093, 1096-97 (D.C. Cir. 1973)(court relied on McClain to find plain error for
failure of trial judge to issue immediate sua sponte instruction limiting use of prior inconsis-
tent statements).
53. 277 A.2d 99 (D.C. 1971).
54. Id at 100. The jury must not have found these final instructions to be sufficiently
clear. During their deliberations, the jurors asked for further instructions regarding the use
of the prior statements. fd at 101.
55. Appellant urged on appeal that the failure to give an immediate sua sponte instruc-
tion to the jury was plain error, not curable by the instructions in the final charge. Id
56. Id By relying on McClain, the court went beyond the narrow factual situation
presented under § 14-102 and the narrow Coleman rule. In this, the court may have been
indicating its dissatisfaction with Coleman's effect on preserving the rights of the defendant.
57. 287 A.2d 89 (D.C.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972).
58. The jury was instructed that it could only consider the prior conviction as evidence
of defendant's truthfulness while testifying, not as evidence of his guilt. Id. at 91 n.4. This
evidence is permissible for impeachment purposes "only if the criminal offense (A) was pun-
ishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year. . . or (B) involved dishonesty or
false statement (regardless of punishment)." D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305(b)(1) (1973). Cf.
1979]
Catholic University Law Review
sponte instruction was plain error. Rejecting this contention, the court rea-
soned that although Lofty had properly followed the Coleman-Jones rule
requiring an immediate sua sponte instruction for statements used to im-
peach one's own witness, its holding was not controlling in all cases.59
Since a sua sponte instruction is the exception to the general rule obligat-
ing counsel to request a limiting instruction, the court concluded that the
necessity for the instruction would be determined on an ad hoc basis.6"
Although prior inconsistent statements could sufficiently confuse the jury
as to require an immediate instruction, the court reasoned that this was not
the case with prior conviction evidence which does not directly contradict
the witness's testimony.6'
Despite Dixon's narrow reading of Lofty, suggesting that a further ex-
pansion of the sua sponte obligation was improper,62 Judge Kelly in John-
son I relied on Lofty to create yet another sua sponte obligation. In
Johnson II, Judge Yeagley not only struck down this new requirement,
but also definitively overruled the Lofty requirement of sua sponte instruc-
tions for all multi-purpose evidence.
II. THE DEMISE OF AN ABSOLUTE SUA SPONTE OBLIGATION
When the District of Columbia Court of Appeals first considered the
case of Johnson v. United States, prior law did not clearly establish
whether an immediate sua sponte limiting instruction was required for all
evidence admitted for a limited purpose. Judges Kelly and Mack deemed
Lofty to be controlling,63 despite the Dixon court's limitation. Since John-
son involved the government's use of a prior inconsistent statement to im-
peach an adverse witness rather than one of its own, the Lofty
interpretation of section 14-102 did not strictly apply. In its decision to
FED. R. EvID. 609 (permits discretion of trial judge for felony convictions not involving
dishonesty or false statement).
59. 287 A.2d at 97-98.
60. Id at 98-99.
61. Id at 99. By contrast, in urging that Lofty be overruled, the government argued
that prior conviction evidence was substantially more prejudicial than prior inconsistent
statements. Petition for Rehearing, supra note 17, at 4.
62. See Simmons v. United States, 364 A.2d 813, 817-18 (D.C. 1976)(Lofly not control-
ling since no statute limiting the admissibility of the evidence); Watts v. United States, 362
A.2d 706, 711 n. II (D.C. 1976)(en banc)(Lofty distinguished because witness adopted prior
statement).
63. In Johnson II, dissenting Judges Kelly and Mack retreated from this position. In-
stead, they argued, consistent with their majority decision in Johnson I, that the limiting
instruction was necessary to prevent jury confusion that would result from the use of the
prior statement, regardless of whose witness was being impeached. 387 A.2d 1084, 1091
(Kelly, J., dissenting).
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reverse, however, the court avoided this obstacle by relying on Lofty's ra-
tionale rather than its facts. It reasoned that the Lofty limiting instruction
sought to prevent the jury from using the content of the prior statement as
evidence of defendant's guilt. Although the jury could presume that sub-
stantive evidence was being offered when a party impeached its own wit-
ness,' the majority, citing Jones, concluded that this danger was present
whenever any prior inconsistent statement was offered.65 To support this
conclusion, the court relied on dicta in Dixon that prior inconsistent state-
ments were more confusing to the jury than evidence of a prior convic-
tion.66 Accordingly, the court held that an immediate instruction, sua
sponte, was necessary to limit the prior inconsistent statement offered by a
party to impeach an adverse witness.67 This new sua sponte obligation,
however, was short-lived.
Judge Yeagley in Johnson II focused on restricting the plain error ex-
ception to the Rule 30 requirement that counsel request instructions during
the course of the trial. Noting that Johnson I's reliance on Lofty had ex-
cessively broadened the scope of the exception and that Dixon was more
analogous because it involved the government's use of evidence against an
adverse witness,68 the majority relied on Dixon rather than Lofty to reach
its decision that an immediate sua sponte instruction was not required.
Additionally, the majority overruled Lofty "to the extent that it conferred
on the trial court an absolute sua sponte obligation to issue an immediate
cautioning instruction whenever evidence is brought in which is admissible
only for a limited purpose."69 Although the court stated that an immedi-
64. The dissent offered the argument, rejected by the majority, that the relationship
between counsel and its own witness could mislead the jury regarding the nature of the
evidence being offered. 356 A.2d at 641.
65. Id
66. Id at 641-42. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
67. The majority presumed that the verdict of guilty resulted from the jury's use of the
statement as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt. Id at 641 n.4. This fact formed
the basis of their dissenting argument in Johnson HI that failure to limit immediately the use
of the evidence resulted in substantial prejudice. See note 73 and accompanying text infra.
68. 387 A.2d at 1087. The court failed to note that the basis of the Dixon distinction
was the type of evidence being offered, not the relationship between the witness and the
attorney introducing the evidence. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
69. 387 A.2d at 1087. It is questionable whether Lofty ever stood for this broad propo-
sition since the facts involved only prior inconsistent statements under § 14-102. Despite
subsequent decisions that have avoided Lofty's broad rule, see Simmons v. United States,
364 A.2d 813, 818 (D.C. 1976); Watts v. United States, 362 A.2d 706, 711 n.ll (D.C.
1976)(en banc); Dixon v. United States, 287 A.2d 89, 97 (D.C.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926
(1972), the majority may have decided that explicitly overruling Lofty's broad holding was
necessary to avoid any future decisions similar to Johnson .
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ate sua sponte instruction under section 14-102 would still be required,7°
the decision effectively eliminates the trial judge's obligation to give this
instruction.7 l
The divergent decisions authored by the two Johnson panels may derive
from their respective applications of the plain error rule. The majority, in
finding the final charge to the jury to be sufficient, did not analyze the
danger of the jury using the prior statements as substantive evidence and
the concomitant prejudice to Johnson. 7 By contrast, the dissent, in a de-
tailed analysis of the facts and circumstances of the trial, noted that the
statements used to impeach Allen were not only the sole evidence implicat-
ing Johnson in the crime, but were also improperly emphasized by the
government in its closing argument. The jury, the dissent reasoned, must
have considered the statements substantively in order to have reached a
verdict of guilty. Since this was sufficiently prejudicial to Johnson's right
to a fair trial, the dissent concluded that the trial court's failure to use an
immediate sua sponte instruction to mitigate this danger was plain error.73
These conflicting approaches raise the question of whether the Johnson
I majority was correct in not finding plain error. To resolve this ques-
tion, it is necessary to analyze the facts in Johnson under the test for plain
error: whether the error was "so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as
to jeopardize the very fairness of the trial.",74 Application of this standard
requires, by review of the record as a whole,75 an examination of the
70. 387 A.2d at 1087 n.5.
71. The majority accomplished this result by stating, subsequent to its assurances of the
continued validity of the § 14-102 instruction, that such an instruction was not absolutely
required. Instead, any sua sponte instruction should be limited to including essential princi-
ples of law in the final charge. The court specifically mentioned the basic elements of the
offense charged and the standard of proof to be applied. It did not, however, intend this to
be an exclusive list. The court reasoned that these and other principles of law were more
necessary to ensure basic fairness than limiting instructions. Id at 1088.
Nonetheless, the Coleman-Jones rule requiring an immediate sua sponte instruction may
still be binding. Since Jones and Coleman were decided before the effective date of the
Court Reorganization Act, see note 34 supra, these decisions are still precedent unless over-
ruled or expressly not followed by the D.C. Court of Appeals en banc. Johnson II was an
implicit, not explicit, refusal to reaffirm the rule of these cases.
72. Rather than analyze whether failure of the trial court to issue an immediate sua
sponte instruction substantially prejudiced Johnson's rights, the court briefly stated that,
upon review of the record, it found the limiting instruction included in the final charge to be
sufficient. 387 A.2d at 1089.
73. Id at 1090 (Kelly, J., dissenting). See Brief for Appellant at 16-17, Johnson v.
United States, 356 A.2d 639 (D.C. 1976), rep'd, 387 A.2d 1084 (D.C. 1978)(en banc).
74. 387 A.2d at 1089. See also Christian v. United States, 394 A.2d 1, 24 (D.C. 1978);
Watts v. United States, 362 A.2d 706, 709 (D.C. 1976)(en banc).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Jennings, 527 F.2d 862,868-69 (5th Cir. 1976); United
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strength or weakness of the government's case,7 6 the materiality of the evi-
dence in question," the possible damaging effect of the evidence,78 and the
efforts used to mitigate that effect.79 Although there was evidence in John-
son to show that a robbery had been committed, Allen's prior statement
was the only evidence directly inculpating Johnson."° Since it went to the
issue of guilt, the statement was material as well as inflammatory. Fur-
thermore, as the only substantive evidence, it was indicative of the weak-
ness of the government's case. Unless properly limited, its admission
potentially jeopardized Johnson's right to a fair trial. Nonetheless, the ma-
jority concluded that the final charge to the jury was sufficient to prevent
prejudice, without analyzing the possible mitigating effect of an immediate
sua sponte instruction as required by the plain error rule.
The court reached its conclusion of insufficient prejudice despite prior
rulings that limiting instructions included only in the final charge are inad-
equate to limit the prejudicial impact of prior statements. Commentators
and judges agree that if limiting instructions are to neutralize the impact of
damaging evidence, they should be given at the time the evidence is of-
fered. Timely instructions, directed to a specific piece of evidence, have
maximum immediate impact on the jurors, mitigate improper considera-
tion of the evidence during the course of the trial, and prevent the prosecu-
tion from making improper references to the evidence in its summation.
Because limiting instructions given only in the final charge do not relate
specifically to the evidence in question and are included with all of the
States v. D'Antonio, 362 F.2d 151, 155 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 900 (1966); Adams v.
United States,302 A.2d 232, 234 (D.C. 1973).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Dye, 508 F.2d 1226, 1234-35 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 974 (1975)(no plain error where sufficient evidence of guilt other than extrajudicial
statement); United States v. Lester, 491 F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 1974)(citing United States v.
Lipscomb, 425 F.2d 226, 227 (6th Cir. 1970))(plain error where government presents weak
case and judge fails to instruct jury that impeachment evidence cannot be considered sub-
stantively).
77. See, e.g., United States v. DeLaMotte, 434 F.2d 289, 294 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 921 (197 1)(no plain error where prior conviction evidence, admitted without a cau-
tionary instruction, added nothing material to the case); Osborn v. United States, 391 F.2d
115, 118 (10th Cir. 1968)(no plain error where evidence contained nothing of substance
which could prejudice the defendant if improperly considered).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Lipscomb, 425 F.2d 226, 227 (6th Cir. 1970)(plain error
where prior inconsistent statement, admitted without a cautionary instruction, contained
substantive elements that government was required to prove).
79. See, e.g., DeCarlo v. United States, 422 F.2d 237, 240 n.1 (9th Cir. 1970)(no plain
error where final charge sufficient to mitigate effect of prior statements).
80. The evidence offered at trial indicated that the victim was unable to identify John-
son as one of the actors in the robbery. See Johnson v. United States, 356 A.2d 639, 640,
rev'd, 387 A.2d 1084 (D.C. 1978)(en banc). See also Brief for Appellant, supra note 73, at
16.
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other instructions which must be given to the jury, they have little, if any,
impact .8  This suggests, contrary to the majority's conclusion, that an im-
mediate instruction in Johnson could have prevented either the jury or the
government from improperly using the substance of the prior statement.
The majority's misapplication of the plain error rule must be evaluated
in light of challenges to the overall effectiveness of limiting instructions.
There is some authority supporting the theory that jurors are able to follow
limiting instructions.82 The majority of jurists and commentators, al-
though recognizing that such an instruction is necessary because it "fur-
thers, rather than impedes the search for truth,"83 assert that jurors are
unable to perform the "mental gymnastic" of limiting the use of the evi-
dence.8 4 Based on this rationale, the majority could have reasoned that,
despite the damaging impact of the statement, plain error was not commit-
ted because a limiting instruction would have been useless to overcome
prejudicial impact. By stating that the final charge was sufficient to rem-
edy the prejudicial effect of Allen's prior statement, however, the Johnson
It court implicitly conceded the effectiveness of limiting instructions. Ac-
cordingly, it should have found, in light of authority that links effective-
81. See Coleman v. United States, 371 F.2d 343, 346 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1966)(per curiam),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 (1967). See generally I WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 8, at
105105]; WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 13, at Evidence § 5066.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Sisto, 534 F.2d 616, 625 (5th Cir. 1976)(a properly in-
structed jury is able to follow a limiting instruction). Furthermore, there is a presumption
that jurors can and do follow instructions. See Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S.
341, 367 (1963); United States v. Harris, 211 F.2d 656, 659 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
822 (1954); Bates v. United States, 327 A.2d 542, 547 (D.C. 1974). See generally I WEIN-
STEIN & BERGER, supra note 8, at 105105]. But see E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF
PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 105 (1956)(use of limiting
instructions fosters inconsistent attitude toward jury "treating them at times as a group of
low-grade morons and at other times as men endowed with a superhuman ability to control
their emotions and intellects").
83. Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 556
(1932).
84. See, e.g., Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949)(Jackson, J., concur-
ring)("naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury
[which] all practicing attorneys know to be unmitigated fiction"); United States v. Bussey,
432 F.2d 1330, 1334-35 (D.C. Cir. 1970)("it blinks reality to think that . . . the jury was
capable of the 'mental gymnastic' of disregarding this evidence in 'any respect' except as to
the one purpose permitted by the trial court"); Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 556 (1932)("mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only [the
jury's] powers, but anybody else's"); MORGAN, supra note 82, at 103 ("to expect a jury actu-
ally to go through the process of separating the inadmissible evidence from the admissible
and to eliminate its effect from their conscious minds. . . is to expect the impossible"). Cf.
Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744, 753-54 (1959)(instruc-
tions to disregard tend to sensitize jurors in liability cases). See generally Note, The Limiting
Instruction-Its Effectiveness and Effect, 51 MINN. L. REV. 264 (1966).
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ness of limiting instructions to their timeliness, that the admission of the
prior statement without an immediate sua sponte instruction was plain er-
ror.
The majority's failure to analyze its application of the plain error stan-
dard, coupled with its emphasis on judicial economy, indicates that the
Johnson HI court gave controlling weight to this latter factor in reaching its
decision. In contrast to prior decisions holding that an immediate sua
sponte limiting instruction for prior inconsistent statements offered against
one's own witness was the most efficient way to preserve the interests of
justice and judicial economy, Johnson I suggests that judicial economy
and efficiency are best preserved by determining plain error on a case-by-
case basis.8 5 The decision implies that a per se rule of plain error allows
unnecessary retrials by permitting the attorney to create error through de-
liberate inaction. 6 Furthermore, application of the per se rule is poten-
tially overbroad. Relying on the per se rule, a court may require a retrial
when, under a plain error analysis, there has been no prejudice to substan-
tial rights. This could occur in cases where there is sufficient other evi-
dence of guilt, or where the evidence goes to a material issue. By contrast,
the case-by-case approach requires analysis of each factual situation and
an actual determination of substantial prejudice, 7 thereby limiting rever-
sals and retrials to instances when plain error truly exists.
The Johnson HI court may also have wanted to enhance the speed and
flow of the trial by eliminating unnecessary interruptions. In Coleman, the
District of Columbia Circuit Court saw no burden in requiring an immedi-
ate instruction for prior inconsistent statements of one's own witness.
Since the trial judge must make a finding of surprise before permitting the
prior statement, a warning instruction could easily be issued at that time. 8
85. It could also be argued that Johnson H1 will impair rather than improve judicial
economy. By eliminating the per se rule for limiting instructions, the decision permits judi-
cial discretion to determine whether an instruction is required and, therefore, a greater pos-
sibility for judicial error. Consequently, although the number of unnecessary retrials may
be reduced, Johnson 1H may cause an increase in the number of appeals.
86. 387 A.2d at 1086-87. See also Simmons v. United States, 364 A.2d 813, 816-17
(D.C. 1976); Watts v. United States, 362 A.2d 706, 709 (D.C. 1976)(en banc); Dixon v.
United States, 287 A.2d 89, 98-99 (D.C.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972); Comment, Basic
and Fundamental Error- The Right Result for the Wrong Reason, 43 TEMP. L.Q. 228, 230
(1970). Additionally, the government urged this theory as grounds for reversing Lofty. Peti-
tion for Rehearing, supra note 17, at 7. The dissenters, however, criticized this position as
"gratuitous remarks" not material to the issues of the case. 387 A.2d at 1090 (Kelly, J.,
dissenting).
87. 387 A.2d at 1089.
88. 371 F.2d at 346. Assuming that the § 14-102 requirement for a limiting instruction
is still valid, see note 71 supra, this would still be true. See also notes 31-32 supra.
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With other kinds of multi-purpose evidence, however, an immediate in-
struction is more burdensome since the need for an instruction is not al-
ways obvious when evidence is offered.89 Under the broad Lofty rule, the
trial would be transformed into a series of bench conferences to make
these determinations.9" Although the need for many of these conferences
may be obviated by the prepared attorney who informs the judge in ad-
vance that an instruction may be necessary, the flow of the trial would still
be interrupted by repeated admonishments from the bench regarding the
proper use of the evidence. Rather than prevent prejudice to the defend-
ant, the absolute sua sponte obligation may actually interfere with the co-
herent presentation of the defense.9' By eliminating this obligation,
Johnson II will predictably reduce the number of these interruptions. Ad-
ditionally, by reversing the effect of Coleman, the Johnson II rule places
responsibility for requesting limiting instructions on the attorney. Under
these circumstances, waiver would be presumed if counsel made no re-
quest.92 This not only avoids interference with the attorney's tactical
objectives, such as preventing the emphasis of unfavorable evidence to the
jury, but also conforms with traditional notions of the adversary system
which places primary responsibility for preserving the rights and interests
of the parties with the attorney, not the judge.9 3
Johnson IIs elimination of a per se sua sponte instruction will result in
the inadvertent admission of hearsay. This prejudice to the defendant's
right to a fair trial may outweigh benefits derived from the increase in
judicial economy and efficiency. Although the District of Columbia ad-
heres to the orthodox rule that prior inconsistent statements can be used
only for impeachment purposes, there is a growing trend permitting the
limited admissibility of these statements as substantive evidence. Advo-
cates of this limited admissibility offer two rationales. First, since the de-
clarant is usually on the witness stand subject to cross-examination, the
reliability and veracity problems inherent in extrajudicial statements are
eliminated.94 Second, proponents maintain, the prior statement is more
reliable than the statement made while on the stand because it is made
89. See, e.g., Forbes v. United States, 390 A.2d 453, 461-62 (D.C. 1978)(Mack, J., dis-
senting).
90. See Dixon v. United States, 287 A.2d at 98.
91. Id
92. This presumption would avoid any determinations of whether counsel had, in fact,
manifestly waived the instruction. See note 49 supra.
93. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976); McNeely v. United States, 353
F.2d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 1965); Simmons v. United States, 364 A.2d 813, 816 (D.C. 1976).
94. See 3A WIGMORE, supra note 23, at § 1018; McCormick, The Turncoat Witness:.
Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence, 25 TEx. L. REV. 573, 576 (1947).
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closer to the time of the occurrence when the memory is more likely to be
accurate. 95 These rationales have been incorporated into Rule 801(d)
(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Evidence allowing prior inconsistent state-
ments "given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at trial, hearing
or other proceeding" to be admissible as nonhearsay substantive evi-
dence.96 Although the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has not
adopted the federal rule, Johnson HI may be an implicit acknowledgement
of its premise that permitting jurors to consider the contents of prior state-
ments does not cause undue prejudice.97
Johnson I thus emerges as a decision enhancing the judicial process
without additionally burdening the rights of the parties. Its merits, how-
ever, may be undermined by its flawed application of the plain error rule.
Johnson 11 incorrectly ruled that the general limiting instruction included
in the final charge adequately mitigated the effect of a prior statement so
prejudicial that plain error standards would have required an immediate
sua sponte limiting instruction. By finding no substantial prejudice when
Johnson's right to a fair trial had been unduly impaired, the Johnson 1H
court has steepened the requirements for showing plain error. Conse-
quently, the task of proving plain error will now be more difficult, and
arguably impossible, when there is a failure to issue an immediate sua
sponte instruction limiting the use of prior inconsistent statements.98
III. CONCLUSION
Johnson HI eliminates the prior per se obligation on the District of Co-
lumbia trial court to issue an immediate instruction, sua sponte, limiting
the use of prior inconsistent statements. In so doing, the decision promotes
95. See United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929, 933 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979
(1964); Asaro v. Parisi, 297 F.2d 859, 863-64 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 904 (1962);
McCormick, supra note 94, at 577. See also Ordover, Suprise! That Damaging Turncoat
Witness is Still With Us.- An Analysis of Federal Rules of Evidence 607, 801(d)(1)(A) and 403,
5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 65 (1976)(prior inconsistent statements should be admitted substantively
since they are beneficial to the prosecution).
96. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(l)(A) & Adv. Comm. Notes. For a general discussion of the
practical implications of this rule, see 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 8 at
801(d)(l)(A)[01]-[08].
97. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(l)(A) would not apply to Johnson because Allen's prior state-
ment was not made under oath. See text accompanying note 95 supra. The D.C. Court of
Appeals, however, has acknowledged the conflict between D.C. law and the federal rules in
a case prior to Johnson, see Parker v. United States, 363 A.2d 975, 977-78 (D.C. 1976), and
has recently given indirect approval to FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) and its rationale. See
Forbes v. United States, 390 A.2d 453, 456-58 (D.C. 1978).
98. The requirement of any limiting instruction at all is questionable. See Forbes v.
United States, 390 A.2d 453, 461 (D.C. 1978)(Mack, J., dissenting)(no plain error even
though no instruction limiting prior statement included in final charge).
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judicial efficiency and economy. To reach this result, however, the Johnson
I majority found that the failure to limit immediately the use of a highly
prejudicial statement was not plain error-an arguably incorrect applica-
tion of the law. By focusing on whether any limiting instruction was given,
rather than analyzing the prejudicial impact of the prior statement, as sug-
gested by the dissent, Johnson II may permit errors that substantially
prejudice a party's right to a fair trial. Johnson H1, therefore, achieves judi-
cial economy by compromising a defendant's right to a fair trial.
The Johnson H holding will also allow the inadvertent admission of
hearsay in those situations when counsel does not request an immediate
instruction, subverting settled District of Columbia law prohibiting the use
of prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence. This implicit
challenge to the District law, however, is consistent with the federal rules
which recognize the reliability of some prior inconsistent statements. Con-
sequently, rather than indirectly allow this admission of prior statements
through elimination of the obligation of an immediate sua sponte limiting
instruction, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals should expressly
recognize prior inconsistent statements as an exception to the hearsay
rule.99
Jo Ann Abramson
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-A Nonresident Defendant
Corporation is Subject to Personal Jurisdiction in the
District of Columbia when its Contacts in the Forum
Involve Substantial Commercial Relations With the
Federal Government Acting in its Proprietary Capacity.
Ramamurti v. Rolls-Royce Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 407 (D.D.C.
1978). The First Amendment Provides the Only
Principled Basis for Exempting a Foreign Corporation
from Suit in the District of Columbia, when its Contacts
are Encompassed by the Long-arm Statute and are
99. In order to effect such a change in existing common law, the D.C. Court of Appeals
must render a decision en bane. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C. 1971) and note 34
supra; D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-946 (1973). If enacted as an amendment or addition to the
D.C. Code, it must be passed by Congress.
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Sufficient to Withstand a Traditional Due Process Attack.
Rose v. Silver, 394 A.2d 1368 (D.C. 1978), rehearing denied,
No. 12555 (D.C. Mar. 1, 1979).
Principles defining the jurisdiction of a forum state over in personam'
actions against nonresident defendant corporations have an amorphous
quality which eludes convenient judicial tests and repeatedly relegates ju-
risdiction contests to the bothersome category of legal questions resolvable
only on an ad hoc basis.2 The permissible scope of jurisdiction over for-
eign corporations is customarily established by state long-arm statutes,
3
1. The traditional basis for jurisdiction is the presence of the parties or property in-
volved in the action within the territorial boundaries of a state and its courts. Territorial
power is expressed in three procedural categories of jurisdiction - inpersonam, in rem, and
quasi in rem. In personam jurisdiction is traditionally established by personal service of
process effected while the defendant or some qualified representative is physically within the
boundaries of the state whose courts are asserting jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235 (1958). The physical presence element of in personam jurisdiction has been
liberalized, however, to include such things as citizenship, Blackmer v. United States, 284
U.S. 421, 438 (1932); domicile, Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S 457, 463 (1940); and consent,
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927). In rem jurisdiction is asserted to determine
rights in property capable of seizure by the state. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Hutchinson,
352 U.S. 112 (1956). Quasi in rem jurisdiction is similarly based upon the power to seize a
defendant's property within a state's territorial authority, but is asserted to adjudicate claims
unrelated to that property. The most common examples of quasi in rem proceedings are
atttachment and garnishment. See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1969); Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905); Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111,216 N.E.2d 312,
269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). Quasi in rem actions were substantially limited in Shaffer v. Heit-
ner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), when the Court rejected state court jurisdiction based solely upon
the presence of a defendant's property. The Court held that where property is neither the
subject matter of the litigation nor in some way related to the cause of action, due process
precludes a binding judgment unless there has been a showing of other ties among the de-
fendant, the state, and the litigation. The sufficiency of these other ties is evaluated accord-
ing to the "minimum contacts" standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945), which prescribes the jurisdictional limits of inpersonam actions against nonresi-
dent defendant corporations. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 207-12; note 4 infra.
2. See, e.g., Mulhern v. Holland America Cruises, 393 F. Supp. 1298, 1301 (D.N.H.
1975); Campbell v. Triangle Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Environmental
Research Int'l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d 808, 811 (D.C. 1976) (en
banc); Chesapeake Supply & Equip. Co. v. Manitowoc Eng'r Corp., 232 Md. 555, 562, 194
A.2d 624, 628 (1963); Detroit Plastic Prods. Corp. v. Tolco Corp., 15 Mich. App. 34, 39, 166
N.W.2d 1, 4 (1968); Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42, 45 (Okla. 1964), appeal
dismissed and cert. denied, 376 U.S. 513 (1964); Abney Mills v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co.,
265 N.C. 61, 71, 143 S.E.2d 235, 242 (1965).
3. The assertion of in personam jurisdiction over foreign corporations is predicated
upon the existence of a statute providing for valid service of process. These "long-arm"
statutes typically permit service upon corporations doing business in the forum state; how-
ever, no precise rules have been developed to infallibly identify what conduct complies with
such a standard. State legislatures have adopted a wide variety of permissible bases for
proper service. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 395.5 (West 1973) ("A corporation ...
may be sued in the county where the contract is made or is to be performed, or where the
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which in turn are subject to various constitutional limits.' Simplified, the
prerequisites dictate that a corporate defendant must be doing business in,
and maintaining contacts with, the forum state to a degree sufficient to
insure that jurisdiction will not offend due process.' Accordingly, in
obligation or liability arises, or the breach occurs; or ... where the principle place of busi-
ness of such corporation is situated ...."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 47.051 (West Supp. 1978)
(service permitted when nonresident corporation is "doing business" within the state); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 617.3 (West Supp. 1979) ("transacting business" standard for proper service);
N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 302(a)(1) (McKinney 1972) (service permitted when nonresident
"transacts any business within the state").
Judicial construction of the intended coverage of these long-arm statutes has been equally
varied. Compare Phillips v. Hooker Chem. Corp., 375 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1967) and Time,
Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1966) (Florida and Louisiana long-arm statutes
extend jurisdiction to full limits of due process protections) with Davis v. Triumph Corp.,
258 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. Ark. 1966) (Arkansas long-arm statute construed more narrowly
than the permissible coverage of due process).
4. The Supreme Court has devoted considerable attention to the establishment of
guidelines describing the due process restrictions on state jurisdiction over nonresident cor-
porations. In its landmark decision, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945), the Court held that in order to subject a foreign corporation to inpersonam jurisdic-
tion, the due process clause demands that the defendant have certain minimum contacts
with the forum state such that maintenance of the suit would not offend traditional notions
of "fair play and substantial justice." Id at 320. This minimum contacts test was subse-
quently applied in McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), to uphold California
long-arm jurisdiction over a Texas insurance company whose only contacts with the state of
California consisted of transactions conducted by mail between the company's Texas office
and policyholders in California. The Court found that "[it is sufficient for purposes of due
process that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection with that
State . . . ." 355 U.S. at 223. The Court further clarified the minimum contacts test in
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), when it held that "it is essential in each case that
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws." Id at 253. See generally Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and
the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts - From Pennoyer to Denkla. A Review, 25 U.
CHI. L. REV. 569 (1958); Sobeloff, Jurisdiction of State Courts Over Nonresidents in Our Fed-
eral System, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 196 (1958); Developments in the Law.- State-Court Jurisdic-
tion, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909 (1960).
5. Prior to International Shoe, there existed two major theories of state jurisdiction
over foreign corporations. The "consent" theory premised jurisdiction upon the state's right
to impose, as a condition of transacting business within its borders, a requirement that non-
resident corporations appoint an agent to receive service of process. The "presence" theory
argued that "[a] foreign corporation is amenable to process to enforce a personal liability, in
the absence of consent, only if it is doing business within the State in such manner and to
such extent as to warrant the inference that it is present there." See, e.g., Philadelphia & R.
Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917). Eventually, both theories merged into a "doing
business" basis for personal jurisdiction - a standard adopted by numerous state long-arm
statutes. See Kurland, supra note 4, at 577-86. When the Supreme Court defined the due
process limitations on state court jurisdiction in International Shoe, the statutory "doing
business" standard was construed in some states as a basis for jurisdiction synonymous with
the permissible coverage under due process. See note 3 supra. See generally Currie, The
Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F.
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resolving questions of jurisdiction, attention is focused primarily upon the
substantiality of a defendant's contacts with the forum state, and to a lesser
extent, upon the character of those contacts.6
In the District of Columbia, this predominantly quantitative analysis for
establishing in personam jurisdiction has been complicated by an addi-
tional element uniquely relevant to that jurisdiction - a "government
contacts" exception. As it was first articulated during the Second World
War,7 this principle recognized that the accumulation of new commercial
and regulatory responsibilities by the federal government would inevitably
draw nonresident corporations into the District of Columbia exclusively to
entertain government relationships. In the interest of preserving unfet-
tered access to federal agencies, courts have consistently held that entry
into the District of Columbia by nonresidents solely for the purpose of
contacting the government was not a basis for the assertion of inpersonam
jurisdiction.8 With the protection of the government contacts exception,
representatives of foreign corporations could comfortably refuse service of
process in the District of Columbia, so long as their activities were con-
fined to governmental liaison. When contested in litigation, courts invari-
ably quashed service in such circumstances, even when the defendants'
relations with the government were predominantly commercial.9
As recently as 1976, the government contacts exception was endorsed as
a "long-standing and still vital doctrine.""0 That vitality, however, has
clearly not survived the treatment of two recent cases. In apparent contra-
diction of prior doctrine, these cases tested the exception against two statu-
tory bases of jurisdiction, and in both instances, upheld jurisdiction over
533; Homburger, The Reach ofNew York's Long-Arm Statute.- Today and Tomorrow, 15
BUFFALO L. REV. 61 (1965); Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Manufac-
turers in Product Liability Actions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1028 (1965).
6. See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 113 (1969) (en banc); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 I11. 2d
432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
7. See Mueller Brass Co. v. Alexander Milburn Co., 152 F.2d 142 (D.C. Cir. 1945);
notes 58-63 and accompanying text infra.
8. See Fandel v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 345 F.2d 87 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Traher v. De
Havilland Aircraft of Can., Ltd., 294 F.2d 229 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 954
(1962); Siam Kraft Paper Co., Ltd. v. Parsons & Whittemore, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 810 (D.D.C.
1975), at'd, 521 F.2d 324 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Environmental Research Int'l, Inc. v. Lockwood
Greene Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d 808 (D.C. 1976) (en banc); Weisblatt v. United Aircraft Corp.,
134 A.2d 713 (D.C. 1957).
9. But see Raymond v. Anthony Co., 233 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1964); notes 80-82 and
accompanying text infra.
10. Environmental Research Int'l v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d 808, 813
(D.C. 1976).
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the respective corporate defendants. I" Because the District of Columbia
enforces two distinct long-arm statutes, the assertion of jurisdiction over a
nonresident will depend, in part, upon which is employed. 12 Section 13-
334 of the District of Columbia Code permits service of process on foreign
corporations "doing business" in the District, regardless of the situs of the
claim; 13 section 13-423 applies a "transacting any business" standard to
claims arising from the defendant's contact with the District.'
4
Construing the "doing business" standard in a 1977 wrongful death ac-
tion against a British corporation, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia refused to quash service effected at the Washington
office of a subsidiary of defendant, Rolls-Royce Ltd.'5 Plaintiff in
Ramamurti v. Rolls-Royce Ltd,16 a resident of the state of Washington,
sought diversity jurisdiction in her complaint alleging that defective Rolls-
Royce aircraft engines had caused the death of her husband in the crash of
an Indian Airlines jet in India.' 7 In responding to the complaint, Rolls-
Royce moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Assuming that
11. See Ramamurti v. Rolls-Royce Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 407 (D.D.C. 1978) (memoran-
dum opinion of Sirica, J.); Rose v. Silver, 394 A.2d 1368 (D.C. 1978).
12. Compare D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-334(a) with § 13-423(a)(1) (1973). While no intrin-
sic difference is expressed by the dissimilar statutory language, legislative intent and judicial
application indicate that the section 13-334 "doing business" standard encompasses a more
narrow range of activities than the "transacting ... business" test of section 13-423, so that
the requisite corporate contacts for District of Columbia jurisdiction are less substantial in
actions brought pursuant to the latter. See notes 91-94 and accompanying text infra.
13. D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-334(a) (1973) provides the following basis for personal juris-
diction: "In an action against a foreign corporation doing business in the District, process
may be served on the agent of the corporation or person conducting its business . . . and
that service is effectual to bring the corporation before the court."
14. D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-423 (1973) provides in pertinent part: "(a) A District of Co-
lumbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an
agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person's - (1) transacting any business in the
District of Columbia .... "
15. Ramamurti v. Rolls-Royce Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 407 (D.D.C. 1978). Service of process
on Rolls-Royce Ltd. was attempted through service on a clerical employee of the Washing-
ton D.C. office of Rolls-Royce, Inc., a Delaware corporation which is a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of Rolls-Royce Holdings North America, Ltd., a Canadian corporation. The latter is
itself a wholly-owned subsidiary of defendant Rolls-Royce Ltd., a corporation organized
under English law. Id at 409. The court refused to entertain the suggestion that the defend-
ant and Rolls-Royce, Inc., upon whom service was effected, occupied a separate corporate
existence. Judge Sirica acknowledged that an agency relation existed to link the two, and
that "[tihe business conduct here by [Rolls-Royce, Inc.] is not its own business, but that of
the parent corporation." Id For jurisdictional purposes, the parent company is said to be
doing business in the forum state through its subsidiary if the subsidiary "is merely an
agent" or "its separate status is formal only." Id (citing 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1069 (1969)).
16. 454 F. Supp. 407 (D.D.C. 1978).
17. Id at 408. Seeking jurisdiction on different grounds, the plaintiff also named as
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service could be effective against it as the parent corporation of a District
of Columbia office,'" Rolls-Royce argued, nonetheless, that its activities
were protected from local jurisdiction by the government contacts excep-
tion.1 9
In his opinion in Rolls-Royce, Judge Sirica acknowledged that much of
the applicable precedent supported the defendant's motion for dismissal.2°
The Rolls-Royce Washington, D.C. office was primarily engaged in re-
sponding to technical inquiries from federal agencies operating equipment
designed or manufactured by the defendant. The office was not authorized
to solicit, negotiate, or contract for sales of Rolls-Royce products.2 ' This
narrow governmental liaison function had frequently been held, in re-
markably similar circumstances, to be an insufficient basis for the assertion
of personal jurisdiction.22 Without distinguishing such cases, Sirica in-
voked dicta from two related opinions23 to conclude that the government
contacts exception would not preclude jurisdiction based upon Rolls-
Royce's local activities.24 In his view, the exception had been limited re-
cently to contacts with the federal government that involve uniquely gov-
defendants Indian Airlines Corp., Air India, Inc. and Aerospatiale, the aircraft manufac-
turer. See id at 412-13.
18. Defendant's Memorandum in Support of a Motion to Quash Service at 2,
Ramamurti v. Rolls-Royce Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 407 (D.D.C. 1978). See also note 15 supra.
19. Because questions of amenability to personal jurisdiction in a diversity action are
determined by reference to the law of the forum state, Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320
F.2d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 1963), federal court jurisdiction would be precluded by a successful
government contacts argument.
20. In discussing Rolls-Royce's characterization of its Washington activities as those of
a liaison office established to deal solely with federal agencies, Sirica noted that "[e]ntry into
the District in such circumstances has frequently been held to be an insufficient basis for the
assertion of personal jurisdiction." 454 F. Supp. at 410-11.
21. Id at 410. The Washington office was primarily responsible for continuing support
services and technical assistance connected with the sale of Rolls-Royce Pegasus jet engines
to the U.S. Marine Corps. Communications maintained with the Marine Corps were in-
tended to insure that parts and service requirements were being met, to provide information
of advanced developments related to the engine, and to capitalize on opportunities to sell
more of the engines.
22. See, e.g., Fandel v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 345 F.2d 87 (D.C. Cir. 1965); notes 83-86
and accompanying text infra; Traher v. De Havilland Aircraft of Can., Ltd., 294 F.2d 229
(D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 954 (1962); notes 72-77 and accompanying text infra;
Weisblatt v. United Aircraft Corp., 134 A.2d 713 (D.C. 1957).
23. Fandel v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 345 F.2d 87, 89 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Siam Kraft Paper
Co. v. Parsons & Whittemore, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 810, 812 (D.D.C. 1975). See notes 83-86 &
103 and accompanying text infra. Sirica also cited Environmental Research Int'l, Inc. v.
Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d 808, 813 (D.C. 1976) (en banc), to suggest a more
limited application of the government contacts exception. 454 F. Supp. at 411. See notes
97-102 and accompanying text iJfra.
24. 454 F. Supp. at 411.
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ernmental functions - those legislative, diplomatic, or lobbying activities
not customarily associated with strictly commercial ventures.25 Sirica
noted that Rolls-Royce's activities would have unquestionably satisfied the
statutory "doing business" standard if its local office had dealt similarly
with private purchasers instead of government agencies.26 Consequently,
he found it not "unseemly" to subject corporations to personal jurisdiction
in the District of Columbia when their contacts with the forum involve
substantial commercial relations with the federal government acting in its
proprietary, as opposed to its governmental, capacity.2
7
In a contemporaneous case before the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, the government contacts exception was tested against the section
13-423 "transacting any business" standard of Washington's other long-
arm statute. 28 In Rose v. Silver,29 a Connecticut corporation was sued for
breach of a contractual obligation to compensate an attorney for con-
ducting negotiations on its behalf before the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA). Pursuant to the agreement, the attorney was to contact the
FDA, and if necessary, initiate litigation in an effort to permit marketing
of certain of the corporation's antibiotic products.3' Having fulfilled these
obligations, the attorney filed an action for unpaid fees and consequential
damages. 3' The trial court dismissed the case, concluding that the plaintiff
had relied "exclusively on his own actions in the District of Columbia, not
any act of the defendants performed by them within the jurisdiction of the
CoUrt.",
3 2
25. Id at 412. The opinion admits that certain of Rolls-Royce's Washington functions
did involve contacts with the government in a nonproprietary role, e.g., reporting noise
characteristics of its jet engines to the Federal Aviation Administration. Nonetheless, Sirica
found that Rolls-Royce did a substantial amount of business in Washington which involved
commercial contacts with the government as a purchaser of its products.
26. See note 107 infra.
27. 454 F. Supp. at 410. See note 25 supra.
28. D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-423 (1973). See note 14 supra.
29. 394 A.2d 1368 (D.C. 1978).
30. Id at 1369. The FDA had acted to revoke official certification of Masti-Kure, a
veterinary drug manufactured by the defendant, on grounds that the product's effectiveness
had not been adequately proven. The defendant sought to keep Masti-Kure on the market
until the FDA took final action on its preliminary notice of decertification.
31. Plaintiff, as defendant's attorney before the FDA, was successful in obtaining a pre-
liminary injunction permitting the marketing of defendant's controversial drug product.
However, the agreed-upon remuneration was allegedly not forthcoming. Id
32. Id at 1372. This language suggests the rule established in Hanson v. Denkla, 357
U.S. 235 (1958), which denied that the independent "unilateral activity" of a contractor in a
forum state could be imputed to an out-of-state defendant for the purpose of obtaining per-
sonal jurisdiction. d at 253. Accord, Environmental Research Int'l, Inc. v. Lockwood
Greene Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d 808, 812 (D.C. 1976) (en banc) ("plaintiff cannot rely on its
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On appeal, the trial court's conclusions were rejected in favor of a find-
ing that the contractual agreement gave rise to a clear agency relationship
between the parties - that the corporate defendant exercised sufficient
control over its forum state agent to satisfy the section 13-423 standard of
"transacting . . .business" in the District.33 Nevertheless, the defendant
argued that the government contacts exception precluded personal juris-
diction since the relevant activities in the District of Columbia were con-
fined to negotiations with a federal agency.34 The same precedent which
disturbed the Rolls-Royce court again appeared to support a dismissal.35
The court retained jurisdiction, however, by distinguishing the prior law as
an application of the inapposite section 13-334 "doing business" standard
which requires more systematic and continuous contacts for jurisdiction
than the "transacting ...business" standard applicable to the instant
case.36 Because the latter test permits the extension of jurisdiction to the
full limits of due process, 37 the court reasoned that whatever due process
underpinnings had existed to support a government contacts exception
were now absorbed by a traditional due process analysis. 38 Finding that
the activities of the defendant's attorney in the District of Columbia were
sufficient contacts to withstand a conventional due process attack on juris-
diction, the court concluded that the same activities need not be tested
again by some additional due process dimension in the government con-
tacts principle - the principle subsumes due process.
39
Unwilling to fully dissolve this recently "vital" doctrine,40 the Rose
court found precedent for preserving a limited government contacts excep-
tion based upon a first amendment right to petition the government for
redress of grievances without the threat of being subjected to suit.4 ' Ac-
cordingly, the court concluded that the first amendment provides the sole
own activities, rather than those of a defendant, to establish the requisite minimal contacts
for personal jurisdiction.")
33. 394 A.2d at 1371.
34. Id at 1372.
35. Id at 1373 (citing, among others, Fandel v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 345 F.2d 87 (D.C.
Cir. 1965), and Mueller Brass Co. v. Alexander Milburn Co., 152 F.2d 142 (D.C. Cir. 1945)).
36. See text accompanying notes 96-101 infra.
37. See notes 91-92 and accompanying text infra.
38. 394 A.2d at 1373-74.
39. Id at 1373.
40. See Environmental Research Int'l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d
808, 813 (D.C. 1976) (en banc).
41. 394 A.2d at 1373-74. The court relied principally upon a brief first amendment
discussion in Environmental Research Int'l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d
808, 813 n.Il (D.C. 1976) (en banc).
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basis for exempting a foreign corporation from District of Columbia juris-
diction when its contacts are within the coverage of the long-arm statute
and are sufficiently substantial to withstand a traditional due process at-
tack.42 The corporate defendant was afforded the opportunity to raise a
first amendment defense on remand in the trial court, but because the issue
had never been specifically addressed in a jurisdictional context, the court
of appeals admitted that consideration of the redefined government con-
tacts exception would "require virtually a fresh inquiry."43 By framing the
exception as a doctrine grounded exclusively in the first amendment, the
Rose court explicitly imposed a constraint established implicitly by the
Rolls-Royce governmental-proprietary distinction. Together, the two
cases reflect a drastic narrowing of a principle which, in prior years, was
embraced as a vastly more expansive exception to District of Columbia
jurisdiction.
I. PROTECTING THE CARPETBAGGERS: THE EVOLUTION OF A
GOVERNMENT CONTACTS EXCEPTION
Three stages of application preceded last year's assaults on the govern-
ment contacts principle. In its incipient stage, the as yet unnamed princi-
ple emerged from repeated judicial refusals to interpret section 13-334's
"doing business" standard as a basis for extending jurisdiction to nonresi-
dent newspaper corporations maintaining correspondents in the District of
42. 394 A.2d at 1374.
43. The fresh inquiry did not materialize in the D.C. Court of Appeals' denial of the
defendant's petition for an en banc rehearing, where the only significant discussion of the
Rose opinion came from Judge Harris' dissent. Harris characterized the Rose court's treat-
ment of the government contacts exception as esoteric, and in conflict with the opinion in
Environmental Research n1', Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, Inc., which had also sug-
gested a first amendment basis for the exception. According to Harris, Rose intimated that
the exception should be limited to protecting first amendment freedoms of speech and press,
rather than the equally strong right to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
This, he says, is contrary to both law and reason. See Rose v. Silver, No. 12555, slip op. at
533-L n.6 (D.C. Mar. 1, 1979) (denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (Harris, J. dissent-
ing). Rose made no such limitations, however, and Harris' suggestions reflect a peculiar
misreading of the opinion. Rose quotes with approval Harris' majority opinion in Lockwood
Greene, explicitly referring to the "redress of grievances" rationale for the exception. 394
A.2d at 1374. In thus shifting the exception's premise exclusively to the first amendment,
Rose observed that:
Only a few cases have discussed the First Amendment issue in this context [of the
government contacts exception], as it pertains to free speech and a free
press. [citations omitted] None to our knowledge has done so with reference to the
right 'to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.' Thus, consideration
of the government contacts principle henceforth will require virtually a fresh in-
quiry.
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Columbia.' Because of Washington's uniquely prolific production of
news, the exclusion of newspapers from the reach of District of Columbia
courts was considered necessary to encourage vigilant reporting of
events,45 and an essential attribute of a free press.46 In a second stage, a
broadly-based exception to jurisdiction was endorsed as a defense avail-
able to nonresidents whose contacts in the District of Columbia were lim-
ited to relations with the government in virtually any capacity.4 ' At this
level, legal analysis in jurisdictional disputes usually went no further than
to characterize a particular defendant's conduct as confined to government
contacts, and to dismiss accordingly."a A third stage emerged in the after-
math of the 1970 passage of the section 13-423 "transacting. . . business"
standard to complement the "doing business" language of the existing
long-arm statute.49  Application of the government contacts principle
under the new statute has suggested a narrowing of the exception - a
suggestion adopted later with less caution by Rolls-Royce and Rose.
A. First Amendment Antecedents
The difficulties inherent in any jurisdiction question are further compli-
cated in the District of Columbia by the unique character of the forum as
the seat of national government. Among other things, the federal govern-
ment is an awesome commercial consumer, a veritable papacy of paternal
regulatory functions, and inevitably, a national center for the generation of
news. These characteristics attract nonresidents to the District of Colum-
bia in special circumstances which may not justify the assertion of personal
jurisdiction. The District of Columbia Circuit confronted this problem in
Neely v. Philadelphia Inquirer Co. 50 It held that employment of a Wash-
ington correspondent was an insufficient basis for subjecting a nonresident
44. See, e.g., Layne v. Tribune Co., 71 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S.
572 (1934); Neely v. Philadelphia Inquirer Co., 62 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
45. In Neely v. Philadelphia Inquirer Co., 62 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1932), the following is
stated: "As the seat of national government, Washington is the source of much news of
national importance, which makes it desirable in the public interest that many newspapers
should maintain vigilant correspondents here." Id at 875.
46. See notes 53-55 and accompanying text infra.
47. See Traher v. De Havilland Aircraft of Can., Ltd., 294 F.2d 229 (D.C. Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 954 (1962); Mueller Brass Co. v. Alexander Milburn Co., 152 F.2d 142
(D.C. Cir. 1945); Weisblatt v. United Aircraft Corp., 134 A.2d 713 (D.C. 1957).
48. See, e.g., Norair Eng'r Assocs. v. Noland Co., 365 F. Supp. 740, 742-43 (D.D.C.
1973) (citing Mueller without discussion as a basis for excusing two codefendants from D.C.
jurisdiction based upon their government contacts).
49. D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-423 (1973).
50. 62 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1932). This action for libel applied D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-
373 (1929), the predecessor to the current long-arm statute, id § 13-334; however, both sec-
tions apply the same "doing business" standard for personal jurisdiction.
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newspaper corporation to District of Columbia jurisdiction. Because
Washington is a source of considerable news, the court saw a public inter-
est in preventing inhibitions on news gathering there.5" Subsequent cases
have conclusively settled that nonresident newspaper corporations main-
taining Washington correspondents are not "doing business" within the
meaning of the District's long-arm statute, and consequently, are not sub-
ject to valid service of process. 2
Confined as they were to statutory construction and policy arguments,
the newspaper cases never specifically suggested a constitutional basis for
denying jurisdiction. While it is somewhat doubtful that the cases actually
intended to proffer any such implications, they were, nonetheless, color-
fully imbued with first amendment drama by successor courts. In Margo-
les v. Johns," a libel action brought in the District of Columbia against a
Wisconsin newspaper, Neely and its progeny were cited with two Fifth
Circuit cases suggesting that assertions of jurisdiction in such circum-
stances require a greater than normal showing of contacts with the forum
state.54 Such a showing was thought to be essential "because of the inher-
ent danger or threat to the free exercise of the right of freedom of the press
ifjurisdiction in every state can be inferred from minimal contacts."55 The
interpolation of first amendment elements from the newspaper cases was
eventually invoked as the foundation of the government contacts excep-
tion.56 Moreover, as precursors of the exception, the newpaper cases pro-
vided subsequent courts with the crucial attachment of jurisdictional
significance to the unique features of Washington as a judicial forum.57
51. 62 F.2d at 875. The court also expressed its fear that the imposition of jurisdiction
in this case would subject "nearly every important newspaper in the nation" to legal service
of process in Washington. Id A similar reservation was expressed much later in cases
construing the government contacts exception. See Siam Kraft Paper Co. v. Parsons &
Whittemore, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 810, 812 (D.D.C. 1975) (jurisdiction based upon government
contacts would convert the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia into a national
judicial forum). Accord, Environmental Research Int'l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs,
Inc., 355 A.2d 808, 813 (D.C. 1976) (en banc).
52. See Bulletin Co. v. Origoni, 387 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
928 (1967); Layne v. Tribune Co., 71 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 572
(1934).
53. 333 F. Supp. 942 (D.D.C. 1971), aft'd, 483 F.2d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
54. Id at 946. See New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966);
Curtis Publishing Co v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1966).
55. Walker v. Savell, 335 F.2d 536, 544 (5th Cir. 1964).
56. See Rose v. Silver, 394 A.2d 1368, 1374 (D.C. 1978); Environmental Research Int'l,
Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d 808, 813 n.l 1 (D.C. 1976) (en banc).
57. See Mueller Brass Co. v. Alexander Milburn Co., 152 F.2d 142, 143 (D.C. Cir.
1945) (quoting Neely with the suggestion that relations between federal agencies and nonres-
idents were not dissimilar from out-of-town newspapers operating news gathering offices in
the District of Columbia).
[Vol. 28:887
Casenotes
B. Mueller and its Followers.- The Blind Leading the Blind
At mid-century, as the federal government moved with less restraint into
its role of commercial consumer, a new community of nonresidents ap-
peared in Washington. Particularly during wartime, representatives of for-
eign corporations established offices in the District in order to maintain
various relations with the government as a purchaser. Testing such con-
tacts as a basis for personal jurisdiction, the District of Columbia Circuit
in Mueller Brass Co. v. Alexander Milburn Co. 58 quashed service delivered
to a Washington agent of defendant, a Michigan manufacturer of military
equipment. 9 The defendant was a large defense contractor whose sales to
the government accounted for virtually all of its production. The Wash-
ington agent, upon whom process was served, was primarily engaged in
maintaining ties with various government agencies for reports, directives,
and allocations pertinent to the company's production requirements.6 °
Additionally, the agent was responsible for soliciting "comparatively
small" purchases in the District of Columbia, 6' although he was not ex-
pressly authorized to personally consummate such transactions. 62 Charac-
terizing these activities as a customary feature of liaison with federal
agencies, and essential to the efficient conduct of defendant's work for the
government, the court found such contacts did not constitute "doing busi-
ness" within the meaning of the long-arm statute.63
In assessing the sufficiency of the defendant's government contacts,
Mueller relied solely upon the newspaper cases as precedent for its sweep-
ing jurisdiction exception.' The court suggested that Washington's status
as a peculiar source of news is analogous, for purposes of asserting juris-
diction, to the "manifold respects in which the federal government touches
[private] business concerns. ' 65 The Mueller analogy is convincing, how-
58. 152 F.2d 142 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
59. The plaintiff, a Maryland corporation, sought diversity jurisdiction in an action for
breach of contract. No part of the contract was negotiated or intended for execution in the
District of Columbia. Id at 142.
60. Id at 143. See text accompanying note 69 infra.
61. Factual findings indicated that the defendant's agent devoted "less than 5% of his
time" to private sales of products in the District of Columbia. Id
62. Id Cf. Ramamurti v. Rolls-Royce Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 407,410 (D.D.C. 1978) (recip-
ient of service of process not authorized to negotiate or contract for sales, and not responsi-
ble for soliciting new business).
63. 152 F.2d at 144. The Washington agent's solicitation functions were found by the
court to be incidental to his presence there. Id According to the rule established in Frene v.
Louisville Cement Co., 134 F.2d 511, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1943), such casual or occasional solici-
tation functions would not alone be considered a basis for jurisdiction.
64. 152 F.2d at 143-44.
65. Id at 144.
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ever, only when the government liaison activity is of the nature of insuring
compliance with regulatory or other requirements unique to dealings with
government. 66 Otherwise, the relationship is indistinguishable from ordi-
nary buyer-seller negotiations. Accepting, for example, that Washington
presents newsgatherers with unusual requirements meriting recognition in
the rules of jurisdiction, there is nothing similarly unique about nonresi-
dent corporations present in the city to maintain commercial relationships
with purchasers coincidentally representing the government. An identical
presence established to deal with private purchasers has never been con-
sidered a basis for excepting nonresidents from District of Columbia juris-
diction.67 On the other hand, a foreign corporation might maintain a
presence in the District of Columbia solely to provide, for example, noise
characteristics of its aircraft engines as required by the Federal Aviation
Administration. 68 This situation is clearly different in terms of justifying a
jurisdiction exception comparable to that enjoyed by newspapers.
Conceivably, the Mueller court intended a more limited application of
the government contacts exception than its broad language suggests. The
Mueller facts describe simply the presence of a Washington agent dealing
with government agencies with respect to "reports, allocations and direc-
tives relating to materials for production . . .. , If this description refers
to the administrative functions required of wartime contractors, then the
government contacts exception was given distinctly limited ambitions by
the Mueller court. The court invited expansive applications, however, by
failing to include any precise limiting language.70 Later courts took a
66. See, e.g., 41 C.F.R. § 50-201.501 (1977) (contractors engaged by the federal govern-
ment must maintain and make available to the Secretary of Labor various employee
records).
67. In Ramamurti v. Rolls-Royce Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 407, 410 (D.D.C. 1978), Judge
Sirica observed that, without question, "were these activities [of Rolls-Royce in Washington]
descriptive of relations with private purchasers rather than with instrumentalities of the fed-
eral government, they would constitute the doing of business within the meaning of' the
long-arm statute.
68. Compliance with such FAA requirements was, in fact, part of the function of the
Rolls-Royce office in Washington. See note 25 supra.
69. 152 F.2d at 144. It is unclear to what extent these represent regulatory requirements
rather than portions of an ongoing sales relationship. Some subsequent courts apparently
thought the distinction was unimportant. See text accompanying notes 71-78 infra.
70. The Mueller opinion expressly retreated from drawing precise parameters for the
exception:
A basic concept of sufficient precision to yield certain results in all cases of this
sort has not yet been formulated. The reported opinions on the subject [of what
constitutes 'doing business'] are multitudinous, the facts are of almost infinite vari-
ety, and the rules used by the courts in resolving the disputes differ. We are not
required to attempt a definition of fundamentals in the case before us.
152 F.2d at 145.
[Vol. 28:887
Casenotes
broad view of the factual setting in Mueller to conclude that jurisdiction
was automatically barred by a simple showing that contacts within the fo-
rum were exclusively, or principally, between the defendant and the fed-
eral government. 7' In Traher v. De Havilland Aircraft of Canada, Ltd ,72
for example, a personal injury action arising from an airplane crash in
Montana, the District of Columbia Circuit found that defendant's govern-
ment liaison office in Washington was not a basis for jurisdiction in the
District of Columbia. The office was responsible for maintaining relations
with various federal agencies regarding aircraft sales by the defendant to
the government, and did not solicit business from anyone other than the
government.73 In granting the defendant's motion to quash service, the
court relied exclusively upon a rather simplistic synopsis of Mueller,'7 with
the observation that "the instant case . . . is strikingly similar in its
facts.",75 The factual similarity is not obvious, however, if any significance
can be given to Mueller's reference to "reports, allocations, and directives"
as descriptive of a particular character of government contacts protected
from jurisdiction. Such contacts are arguably limited to dealing with the
administrative idiosyncracies of association with the government. The ac-
tivities of defendant's Washington office in Traher were described with
considerably less specificity, but its functions appeared to go beyond those
enumerated in Mueller. In Traher, the defendant's employee in the Dis-
trict of Columbia was characterized as a liaison or contact man responsible
for gathering information about the government's "requirements,, 76 as
well as soliciting purchases from the Department of Defense and other
federal agencies.77 The factual discrepancies with Mueller ignored by the
Traher court exhibit supine acceptance of an unsupported view that gov-
ernment contacts of any kind qualify for an exception to jurisdiction in the
District of Columbia. With few exceptions, other courts were equally inat-
71. See, e.g., Traher v. De Havilland Aircraft of Can., Ltd., 294 F.2d 229 (D.C. Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 954 (1962); Norair Eng'r Assocs., Inc. v. Noland Co., 365 F.
Supp. 740 (D.D.C. 1973); Weisblatt v. United Aircraft Corp., 134 A.2d 713 (D.C. 1957).
72. 294 F.2d 229 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 954 (1962).
73. Id at 230. The facts of Traher made it model precedent for a dismissal in Rolls-
Royce; however, in finding to the contrary, Judge Sirica chose not to cite, distinguish or
overrule Traher. See text accompanying notes 113-14 infra.
74. Referring to Mueller, the court said only that there, "the governmental contacts of
the defendant were held insufficient to provide a basis for service in a suit brought by a
plaintiff not involved in those contacts." 294 F.2d at 231.
75. Id
76. 294 F.2d at 230 ("employee's principal duties are to transmit to appellee [defendant]
information about the United States Government's requirements and to keep in contact with
Government agencies").
77. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
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tentive either to factual discrepancies with Mueller, or to the intended pur-
pose and scope of a government contacts exception.7"
Before 1970, the expansive view of the government contacts exception
led to invocations of Mueller in cases premised upon a great variety of
relationships with federal entities. There were common threads, however,
and among those accented was the fact that while contacts were main-
tained with federal agencies regarding government purchases from defend-
ants, the principal function of the Washington offices was not so-
licitation.7 9 The solicitation issue generated the first apparent disaffection
with an expansive Mueller rule. In Raymond v. Anthony,8° the district
court refused to quash service delivered to defendant's Washington agent
because the latter's dealings, although exclusively with the federal govern-
ment, involved considerable attention to soliciting government
purchases.8' Raymond expressly distinguished Mueller as a case involving
only limited attention to the solicitation of sales.82 Later, in Fandel v. Ara-
bian American Oil Co. ,83 the district court accepted a motion to quash
service effected at a Washington government relations office maintained
principally to deal with the State Department, diplomatic missions, and
other organizations interested in the Middle East where defendant had
commercial interests.84 In significant dictum, 85 however, the court noted
78. But see Raymond v., Anthony Co., 233 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1964) (jurisdiction
asserted where defendant's contacts exclusively with the government involved considerable
attention to solicitation of purchases); notes 80-82 and accompanying text infra.
79. See, e.g., Traher v. De Havilland Aircraft of Can., Ltd., 294 F.2d 229, 230 (D.C. Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 954 (1962); Mueller Brass Co. v. Alexander Milburn Co., 152
F.2d 142, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Weisblatt v. United Aircraft Corp., 134 A.2d 713, 715 (D.C.
1957). In these cases, it was also characteristic that the cause of action was unrelated to the
defendant's activities in the District, and the Washington office lacked authority to bind the
defendant in contract.
80. 233 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1964).
81. Id at 306-07. In addition, the Washington agent dealt with problems or difficulties
arising from previous sales of the defendant's products. This, in conjunction with his solici-
tation functions, was considered sufficient to meet the "doing business" prerequisite for
long-arm jurisdiction. 233 F. Supp. at 307. The court relied upon Frene v. Louisville Ce-
ment Co., 134 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1943), which established a basis for jurisdiction in solici-
tation plus a regular and continuous course of business activity. Id at 515.
82. 233 F. Supp. at 306-07.
83. 231 F. Supp. 572 (D.D.C. 1964), afl'd, 345 F.2d 87 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
84. The defendant in Fandel was a Delaware corporation engaged in the production,
refining, and sale of oil in Saudi Arabia. The Washington office had no commercial func-
tion, except to the extent that it could have been considered a public relations organization
indirectly advancing the business opportunities of the defendant. 345 F.2d at 88.
85. Fandel was extensively cited in.Ramamurti v. Rolls-Royce Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 407,
411 (D.D.C. 1978), as a basis for narrowing the government contacts exception. See text
accompanying note 23 supra.
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that the office's limited function was "not quite like the company whose
agents in Washington are seeking contracts, either with our own Govern-
ment or with other governments represented in Washington."86 Fandel
and Raymond represent distinct departures from earlier applications of the
government contacts exception. In Traher17 and elsewhere,88 the solicita-
tion of sales to the government was considered merely a part of the defend-
ants' government contacts, and thus exempt as a basis for jurisdiction.
After Fandel, however, it appeared that the government contacts inquiry
would be required to go beyond a simple characterization of a defendant's
conduct in the District of Columbia as confined to relations with the gov-
ernment. The clear implication was that certain kinds of government con-
tacts were never intended to be a basis for innoculating nonresidents
against District of Columbia jurisdiction.
C. A Longer Armfor District Jurisdiction: Section 13-423
From the subtle inferences of the newspaper cases to the credulous infla-
tion of the Mueller rule, the epigenesis of the government contacts excep-
tion occurred wholly within the purview of the section 13-334 standard for
jurisdiction. A new dimension was added to the exception in 1970 when
Congress passed a second District of Columbia long-arm statute89 to com-
plement the existing section 13-334 "doing business" standard for jurisdic-
tion. Unlike its elder partner which applies generally to all actions
brought in the District of Columbia against nonresident corporations, the
new section 13-423 is relevant only in claims arising from the defendant's
activities in Washington.9° Legislative history indicates that section 13-423
was intended to expand the bases of District of Columbia jurisdiction as
well as modes of service, to conform to those provided by the adjacent
states of Maryland and Virginia.9 ' The statute's "transacting any busi-
ness" standard has been interpreted by the courts of those states as an ex-
tension of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the
86. 345 F.2d at 89.
87. 294 F.2d 229, 230 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 954 (1962). See notes 72-
75 and accompanying text supra.
88. See, e.g., Weisblatt v. United Aircraft Corp., 134 A.2d 713, 715 (D.C. 1957) (Wash-
ington office did not "solicit business from anyone in this District other than agencies of the
government").
89. D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-423 (1973); note 14 supra.
90. See notes 13-14 supra.
91. See S. REP. No. 405, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1969); H.R. REP. No. 907, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 61 (1970). The counterpart statutes of Maryland and Virginia are essentially identi-
cal to section 13-423(a)(1). See MD. ANN. CODE, art. 75, § 96(a)(1) (Supp. 1973); VA. CODE
§ 8-81.2(a)(1) (Supp. 1973).
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permissible limits of due process. 92 For two reasons, this interpretation
has insured that the coverage of section 13-423 will be considerably less
restrictive than that of its still enforceable predecessor. First, the "doing
business" standard of section 13-334 was never interpreted as extending to
the furthest reach of constitutional limitation, and in fact, courts expressly
stopped short of that mark.93 Second, because section 13-423 applies only
to claims arising from the defendant's Washington activities, an assertion
of jurisdiction under this statute automatically assumes a substantial con-
tact with the forum. Consequently, due process will demand less substan-
tial additional contacts under the new long-arm statute than would be
necessary in claims unrelated to the forum. 14 Unrelated claims brought
pursuant to section 13-334 must necessarily face more narrow jurisdic-
tional limits.9 5
Considering the dissimilarities in the two long-arm statutes, the tradi-
tional government contacts exception would conceivably operate differ-
ently under the new version. In a section 13-334 claim unrelated to a
defendant's District of Columbia activities, government contacts may be
an insubstantial basis for jurisdiction, while the same contacts might be
fully adequate to meet the less stringent section 13-423 standard. The
courts predictably stumbled with the possibility that the potency of the
exception might depend upon which statute was employed,96 or more spe-
92. See Groom v. Margulies, 257 Md. 691, 265 A.2d 249 (1970); Kolbe, Inc. v. Chro-
modern Chair Co., 211 Va. 736, 180 S.E.2d 664 (1971).
93. In Fandel v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 345 F.2d 87 (D.C. Cir. 1965), for example, the
court's interpretation of section 13-334 concluded with the reminder that "[wie are constru-
ing what a statute does, and not determining what the furthest reach of legislative power
could be consistent with constitutional limitations." Id at 89.
94. See Grevas v. M/V Olympic Pegasus, 557 F.2d 65 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 969 (1977) (where plaintiff's injuries did not arise from defendant corporation's activi-
ties in the forum state, contacts between the corporation and the state must be fairly substan-
tial before inpersonam jurisdiction may be imposed without offending due process).
95. After the landmark holding in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945), it was unclear whether foreign corporations doing business in a forum state would
ever be amenable to personal jurisdiction there in an unrelated cause of action. See Develop-
ments in the Law- State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 930 (1960). Somewhat
later, however, the Supreme Court held that federal due process neither prohibits nor com-
pels an assertion of jurisdiction in such circumstances. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Min-
ing Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446 (1952). While due process apparently does not prohibit
jurisdiction in an unrelated cause of action, courts have clearly premised jurisdiction on a
showing of more substantial contacts between the defendant and the forum state than would
normally be required. See Grevas v. M/V Olympic Pegasus, 557 F.2d 65 (4th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977); Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 222, 225-
26, 347 P.2d 1, 3-4 (1959) (Traynor, J.).
96. At one time, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia apparently failed
to recognize that two different long-arm statutes existed in the District of Columbia. In
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cifically, upon whether or not the cause of action was related to the District
of Columbia. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals split on this
issue in Environmental Research International, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene En-
gineers, Inc. ,9 a contract action brought by a Washington consulting firm
against a Massachusetts corporation. The defendant was engaged in nego-
tiations to provide engineering services related to the development of a
waste treatment facility in Pennsylvania, but required a construction grant
from the Environmental Protection Agency. Plaintiff offered and con-
tracted to assist in preparing the grant application and expediting its
processing by the EPA.98 Before the alleged breach of the parties' agree-
ment, defendant's personnel visited Washington to consult with officials of
the EPA. The court considered whether these visits to the District of Co-
lumbia were sufficient contacts to create a basis for jurisdiction according
to the section 13-423 "transacting any business" standard.99 Citing Muel-
ler as support, a majority of the court refused jurisdiction,"°° but a well-
reasoned dissent insisted that the Mueller exception was inapplicable in a
section 13-423 case in which the cause of action arises from the defendant's
contacts in the District of Columbia.' The dissent asserted that govern-
ment contacts are sufficiently substantial to permit jurisdiction under a due
process analysis of the new statutory standard. The majority, dismissing
this argument, believed "that had Congress intended to abrogate the Muel-
ler Brass principle in enacting the present long-arm statute [section 13-
423], it thereby would have been placing an impermissible burden on the
first amendment 'right of the people. . . to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances."' 10
2
This particular constitutional recitation was without precedent among
Siam Kraft Paper Co. v. Parsons & Whittemore, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 810, 811 (D.D.C. 1975),
the court found that the defendant's contacts with the government in Washington did not
"constitute 'doing business' within the meaning of... § 13-423(a)(1) .... But, in fact,
§ 13-423(a)(1) applies a "transacting any business" standard.
97. 355 A.2d 808 (D.C. 1976) (Fickling, Mack, & Kelly, JJ., dissenting).
98. Id at 810.
99. Plaintiff also argued that since it was performing services in the District on behalf of
defendant, its own transactions there constituted a proper basis for personal jurisdiction over
defendant. The court disagreed and suggested that acceptance of that proposition would
effectively eliminate the protections afforded to nonresidents by the due process clause. Id
at 812-13. See note 32 supra.
100. Id at 813-14.
101. Id at 816-17. This view was later embraced by the Rose court which expressly
declared its section 13-423 analysis to be inapplicable to section 13-334 cases. 394 A.2d at
1374 n.6.
102. 355 A.2d at 813 n.l 1. The court endorsed the view that the liberally construed mini-
mum contacts requirement must yield when the assertion of jurisdiction threatens the free
exercise of first amendment rights.
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the suggested rationales of Mueller. Framed in this way, the government
contacts exception acquired an inviolable constitutional character unre-
lated to the particular long-arm statute exercised or to the situs of a plain-
tiff's claim."0 3 By emphasizing the first amendment, the court guaranteed
that subsequent attempts to reconcile Mueller, and to apply the exception
within explicable boundaries, would be wrought with confusion. The first
amendment may offer a plausible explanation for denying personal juris-
diction premised, as in Lockwood Greene, solely upon a defendant's nego-
tiations in the District of Columbia for assistance from a federal agency.
But the same constitutional argument does not support the exception
granted in Traher to protect a continuing relationship of commercial ex-
change with government purchasers.' °4 Rather, a government contacts ex-
ception in such a purely commercial setting could only be justified by a
determination that commerce with the government is an inherently insub-
stantial basis for personal jurisdiction in actions unrelated to the District.
Under this traditional due process analysis of the substantiality of a de-
fendant's contacts, the situs of the plaintiff's claim and the long-arm statute
employed could determine, as the Lockwood Greene dissent argued,"0 5
when the exception is applicable. This analysis would also serve to recon-
cile the Mueller devotees as cases in which contacts solely with the govern-
ment did not constitute a sufficiently substantial basis for extending
jurisdiction over claims wholly unrelated to the forum, pursuant to the
more restrictive section 13-334 and the greater due process demands in
unrelated actions.
In debating the applicability of the government contacts exception in
cases brought pursuant to the District of Columbia's new long-arm statute,
the Lockwood Greene court moved awkwardly toward identifying an ac-
ceptable rationale for the exception - a step never undertaken with con-
viction by predecessor courts. Mueller's oft-quoted rule had been
expanded to deny jurisdiction over an entire community of nonresidents
whose business in Washington included everything from simple observa-
tion and information gathering to serious trading with the government.
103. Similar intimations are discernible in another section 13-423 case, Siam Kraft Pa-
per Co. v. Parsons & Whittemore, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 810, 812 (D.D.C. 1975), where the
district court identified the exception as applicable to contacts involving "uniquely govern-
mental activities" - a description which impliedly excludes proprietary functions, and pro-
poses a more complicated formula than the traditional due process test for substantiality of
contacts. This language was cited by Judge Sirica as a basis for narrowing the government
contacts exception in Ramamurti v. Rolls-Royce Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 407, 411 (D.D.C. 1978).
104. See Traher v. De Havilland Aircraft of Can., Ltd., 294 F.2d 229 (D.C. Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 954 (1962); notes 72-77 and accompanying text supra.
105. See text accompanying note 101 supra.
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The first amendment-due process controversy in Lockwood Greene was, at
the very least, an indication that the government contacts exception would
ultimately be reunited with its long disconnected rationale.
II. THE ROLLS-ROYCE - ROSE DIPTYCH
The government contacts exception which emerged from Lockwood
Greene was an invertebrate doctrine in need of a conclusive theoretical
backbone and clearly delineated boundaries describing precisely which as-
sociations with government would be exempt as bases of personal jurisdic-
tion. Rolls-Royce satisfies the latter need but effectively ignores the former
by providing, in guidebook fashion, a simple mechanical device for deter-
mining the applicability of the exception. In testing for substantial com-
mercial relations with the government in its proprietary, rather than
governmental capacity, Judge Sirica was able to uphold jurisdiction over
Rolls-Royce based on the activites of its Washington office.' 06 The office
maintained a relationship with a government purchaser of Rolls-Royce
products, and acting in that proprietary capacity, the government was not
unlike any private commercial consumer. This similarity to the commerce
of private parties 0 7 - an affiliation which traditionally lacks peculiar ex-
ceptions to personal jurisdiction - constitutes Sirica's basis for narrowing
the Mueller exception to contacts involving uniquely governmental func-
tions.
To further clarify the governmental-proprietary distinction, the opinion
distinguished Rolls-Royce's activities in the District of Columbia from the
"legislative, lobbying or diplomatic" functions still protected from jurisdic-
tion by Sirica's newly limited, yet still viable, government contacts excep-
tion. 10 8 The continued exclusion of such functions expresses the only
principled basis for the existence of any special jurisdictional exception in
the District of Columbia. If the foundation of such an exception is, as the
ancestral newspaper cases insist,' 0 9 that the unique characteristics of the
District of Columbia should be reflected by avoiding jurisdiction as an
106. See 454 F. Supp. at 411.
107. The court stated:
There is no question that, were these activites descriptive of relations with pri-
vate purchasers rather than with instrumentalities of the federal government, they
would constitute the doing of business within the meaning of section 334(a). Rolls-
Royce's local activities - conducted by RRI - are regular, systematic, and contin-
uous; constitute a substantial corporate presence here; and are obviously directed
at advancing the corporate objectives of Rolls-Royce.
Id at 410.
108. Id at 412.
109. See notes 50-57 and accompanying text supra.
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impediment to free access to the forum, then clearly only those unique
features deserve exceptional treatment. To the extent that nonresident
businesses are attracted to Washington solely by a government market for
their products, the District is indistinguishable from any other jurisdiction
populated by large mercantile enterprises. Accordingly, there is no defen-
sible reason to provide singular legal protections to merchants supported
by government purchases.
The message of Rolls-Royce is clear, and its contribution to the elimina-
tion of confusion is undeniable. But the reasoning by which Judge Sirica
arrived at the result is largely unspoken. Ironically, the cases selected to
support jurisdiction over Rolls-Royce - including Fandel and Lockwood
Greene" ' - had each dismissed jurisdiction over their respective defend-
ants on the basis of the government contacts exception. Judge Sirica fo-
cused instead on the limiting innuendo in those cases, and in particular,
the conclusion in Fandel that the government contacts cases constitute a
"recognition that Washington presents many business organizations with
special needs for a continuous and ponderable physical presence there,
which needs are not those customarily associated with strictly commercial
operations. . . ." ' " The conclusion is perceptive, but the opinion fails to
reconcile the contradictions of the prior law. Judge Sirica neither over-
ruled, nor explicitly limited Mueller. He referred to the case simply as a
broad exposition of an exception which "has been invoked most recently
in more limited contexts."' 12 Traher was never cited, despite its indistin-
guishable factual circumstances and unmistakably contrary results." 13
Like those of Rolls-Royce's Washington office, the defendant's activities in
Traher were devoted to preserving a continuing sales relationship with
government purchasers of aircraft-related equipment and service. Traher
and Rolls-Royce both arose from aircraft accidents unrelated to the Dis-
trict of Columbia or to the defendant's activities there, and both were
brought pursuant to the section 13-334 long-arm statute. But in contrast to
the Rolls-Royce holding, the District of Columbia Circuit acknowledged
the government contacts exception in Traher as a basis for quashing serv-
ice.' 14
110. Also included was Siam Kraft Paper Co. v. Parsons & Whittemore, Inc., 400 F.
Supp. 810 (D.D.C. 1975). See note 103 supra.
111. 454 F. Supp. at 411 (citing Fandel v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 345 F.2d 87, 89 (D.C.
Cir. 1965)) (emphasis deleted). See notes 83-86 and accompanying text supra.
112. 454 F. Supp. at 411.
113. See text accompanying notes 72-75 supra.
114. Traher was cited in Rolls-Royce's memorandum in support of a motion to quash,
and Judge Sirica was inexplicably remiss in ignoring this irreconcilable holding by a higher
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The omissions in the Rolls-Royce reasoning are disturbing because the
efficacy of prior government contacts cases is left unclear. Moreover, while
Judge Sirica's guidebook formula for applying the exception can be imple-
mented with minimal confusion in future cases, his rationale is unfortu-
nately couched in nonspeak. In a somewhat imperfect fashion, the missing
rationale was supplied by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in
Rose. The Rose case was, of course, factually very different from Rolls-
Royce in that the former was premised upon distinctly noncommercial ac-
tivities in Washington - litigation by the defendant's attorney before the
Food and Drug Administration. 1 5 Also in contrast to Rolls-Royce, Rose
was a section 13-423 action related to, and in fact, synonymous with the
defendant's activities in the District of Columbia. Despite the distinctions,
the two cases parallel each other in applying a dramatically deflated gov-
ernment contacts exception to refuse the defendants' motions to quash. In
holding that the traditional government contacts exception did not protect
the defendant from District jurisdiction under the new, more permissive
section 13-423 analysis, the Rose court portrays the exception as a doctrine
erected from both due process and first amendment principles." 6 Due
process does not permit assertions of jurisdiction based solely upon gov-
ernment contacts under the more restrictive long-arm statute, and the first
amendment prevents jurisdictional intrusions upon government contacts
directed toward a redress of grievances before the federal government.
However, the Rose court reasoned that since section 13-423 extends juris-
diction to the permissible limits of due process, the statutory analysis
would absorb all due process elements of the government contacts excep-
tion, and a defendant reachable under the long-arm statute would be lim-
ited to a first amendment argument as the only remaining rennant of the
jurisdiction exception. 117
Basing the exception upon this two-pronged rationale successfully dis-
tinguishes Mueller and the other section 13-334 cases as due process analy-
ses in which government contacts were found not sufficient to fulfill the
restrictive "doing business" standard. Rose describes these earlier cases as
espousing a government contacts principle designed to protect nonresi-
dents against claims by third parties based on transactions unrelated to the
nonresident's special governmental purpose in the District. 1 8 The court
court. See Defendant's Memorandum in Support of a Motion to Quash Service, Authorities
Principally Relied Upon, Ramamurti v. Rolls-Royce Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 407 (D.D.C. 1978).
115. See notes 29-31 and accompanying text supra.
116. 394 A.2d at 1373-74.
117. Id at 1374.
118. Id at 1374 n.6.
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added that since the section 13-423 standard applied in Rose refers specifi-
cally to claims arising from a business connection in the District, its deci-
sion would not affect earlier government contacts analyses in unrelated
claims brought by third parties. There are, however, some noticeable im-
perfections in this reconciliation of the prior law. The suggested differenti-
ation between the District of Columbia's long-arm statutes is directly
contrary to the majority opinion in Lockwood Greene which argued that
the government contacts exception is unrelated to the situs of the claim, or
to the statute employed.19 Furthermore, the Rose court never adequately
defended the due process prong of its rationale for the exception. The
court said only that each of the earlier government contacts cases involved
an insufficiently "systematic and continuous course of conduct" in the Dis-
trict. 120 While this may be descriptive of the minimal contacts established
by Fandel's Middle East information office, 2 ' it certainly does not de-
scribe the obvious sales posture maintained in Traher.
122
The reasoning flaws present in both Rose and Rolls-Royce do not de-
stroy the essentially identical propositions advanced by the two cases. On
the surface, the holdings seem irreconcilable. Applying Judge Sirica's rea-
soning in Rose, it would seem that litigation by the defendant's attorney
before the FDA would constitute precisely the kind of "lobbying" effort
exempted from jurisdiction by dictum in Rolls-Royce. But by providing
the defendant with an opportunity to proceed with a first amendment de-
fense, Rose does not necessarily contradict Rolls-Royce's lobbying excep-
tion. To the extent that such a defense succeeds, the two cases describe the
same government contacts exception - Rolls-Royce in the form of a
mechanical test, and Rose styled by constitutional rationales. In homogen-
ized fashion, the remaining government contacts exception will apply only
to nonresidents whose activities in the District of Columbia are confined to
relations which are unique to the business of government. The exception
will protect such activities as lobbying for legislative or administrative ac-
tion and the gathering of information for the purpose of complying with
federal regulations unrelated to any commercial relationship between the
defendant and the government. Nor would the situs of the claim be of any
significance. In a section 13-334 action unrelated to the defendant's gov-
ernment contacts, jurisdiction over claims based on these activities will be
precluded by the governmental-proprietary distinction. Under section 13-
119. See text accompanying notes 100-02 supra.
120. 394 A.2d at 1373 (quoting Environmental Research, Int'l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene
Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d 808, 813 n.10 (D.C. 1976) (en banc)).
121. See notes 83-86 and accompanying text supra.
122. See notes 72-77 and accompanying text supra.
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423, jurisdiction based on such activities will either fail under a due proc-
ess attack, or succumb to the protections of the first amendment.
Among the implications of this more systolic government contacts ex-
ception is the likelihood that a large number of foreign corporations will
now be subject to suit in the District of Columbia by virtue of their hereto-
fore protected relations with federal entities. 12 3 Earlier courts expressed
their fear of such an eventuality as a partial basis for preserving the older,
more expansive exception. 124 Judge Sirica dismissed these fears because of
the "adequate mechanisms" of both federal and local law insuring that
defendants will not be required to litigate in an inconvenient forum.'25
Regardless of the effectiveness of these mechanisms, the new government
contacts exception is unlikely to stem the continued growth in the number
of nonresidents in the District of Columbia pursuing relations with the
federal government. Undoubtedly, the most immediate impact of the new
exception will appear in the form of more congested Washington court
calendars. This potentiality, however, does not outweigh the policy con-
siderations which militate in favor of providing plaintiffs with a forum in
which to pursue their claims. Particularly where the party defendant is an
alien corporation like Rolls-Royce Ltd., a broadly enforced government
contacts exception could completely foreclose a plaintiff from pursuing an
action in a court of the United States. The revised exception will minimize
that possibility.
III. CONCLUSION
Rolls-Royce and Rose have returned the government contacts exception
to its historical antecedents and effectively repudiated the applications
which followed the newspaper cases. The newspaper cases stood for the
proposition that the rules of procedure and jurisdiction in the District of
Columbia should take into account the unique characteristics of that fo-
rum as they affect nonresidents. This rule was incorporated into an overly
broad government contacts exemption in Mueller, and the resulting excep-
tion to jurisdiction, poorly stated and without identifiable limits, became
123. See Ramamurti v. Rolls-Royce Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 407, 411 (D.D.C. 1978).
124. See Siam Kraft Paper Co. v. Parsons & Whittemore, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 810, 812
(D.D.C. 1975); Environmental Research Int'l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, Inc., 355
A.2d 808, 813 (D.C. 1976) (en banc) (to permit jurisdiction based solely upon government
contacts "would threaten to convert the District of Columbia into a national judicial fo-
rum").
125. 454 F. Supp. at 411. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976) (change of venue allowed "for
the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice"); D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-
423 (1973) (actions may be stayed or dismissed where interests of justice dictate a more
appropriate forum).
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the basis for a thirty-year reign of the unfounded jurisdictional exclusion
of virtually all government associations. Returning to the rationality of
the newspaper cases, Rolls-Royce and Rose propose that only unique char-
acteristics of the District of Columbia be recognized as bases for excep-
tions to jurisdiction - that associations with government are unique only
in a nonproprietary setting where protected by the constitutional right to
petition the government for a redress of grievances. That conclusion rep-
resents the long-awaited linkage between the exception and its rationale.
In the aftermath of Rolls-Royce and Rose, three untreated issues remain.
There is first the problem of reconciling, limiting, or overruling prior case
law. The Rose opinion attempted to distinguish Mueller and its followers
as applications of an inapposite statute, but that explanation is a clear con-
tradiction of an earlier holding by the same court in Lockwood Greene.
Mueller also runs afoul of the governmental-proprietary distinction in
Rolls-Royce, and Judge Sirica offered no explicit indication of the contin-
ued efficacy of that or other similar cases. A second issue yet to be re-
solved is the largely undeveloped first amendment defense identified in
Rose. The success of this defense seems inevitable, particularly in factual
settings similar to that in Rose. A firm judicial endorsement of the defense
would establish a successor to the old government contacts exception, and
a corollary to the Rolls-Royce test. Finally, a reconciliation of Rolls-Royce
and Rose will ultimately be attempted by a District of Columbia court. It
is inconceivable that the two would be found in substantial conflict, but
certain anomalies remain to be resolved. Preeminent among these is the
notion that government contacts may be a satisfactory basis of jurisdiction
under one long-arm statute, but not under the other. Rose endorsed such a
distinction, while Rolls-Royce relied, without discriminating, upon cases
construing both statutes. Hopefully, the next treatment of the government
contacts exception can correct these structural defects, and erect in their
place a formula free from contradictions, yet loyal to the important
groundwork laid by these two cases.
Dean M Dilley
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